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Federal Rule 17(a): Will the Real
Party in Interest Please Stand?
The author analyzes recent cases interpreting Rule 17(a).
In attempting to arrange the cases into situational rather than
doctrinal categories, he notes that the conceptual language of the
Rule and the courts' treatment of it fail to make explicit the
real interests,strategies, and policies at stake. After examining
the recent amendment to the Rule and proposed jurisdictional
changes, the author concludes that the present Rule is unnecessary and that it should be abolished.

John E. Kennedy*
INTRODUCTION
Recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have clarified the real party in interest rule, Rule 17(a), while
leaving it substantially unchanged. On a related front, the American Law Institute relentlessly pursues a goal of restricting
diversity jurisdiction.' This article examines a number of federal
diversity cases decided since 1948 in light of Rule 17(a), as recently amended, and the ALI's proposed amendments to the

statutes defining diversity jurisdiction.
1.

A.

RULE 17 (a) AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE RULES
REGULATING CHOICE OF PLAINTIFF IN
FEDERAL COURTS

HISTORY

AND CONSTRUCTION

OF THE RULE

While the words also appeared in other contexts, the phraseological ancestors of the real party in interest rule can be found
most frequently in the decisions of equity courts early in the
nineteenth century as a description and justification for allowing suits by assignees of choses in action.2 In effecting the mer* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of
Law. This Article was adapted from a paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a J.S.D. degree. Not included in this
Article is an introduction analyzing the choice of plaintiffs in the federal
courts. The omitted analysis encompasses the strategical objectives of
the attorneys in light of the actual financing, control, and benefit of the
litigation, the state substantive and federal procedural policies that are
at stake, and the process of claim that is carried out with reference to
the language of the existing procedural and constitutional rules.
1. See Farage, Proposed Code Will Emasculate Diversity Jurisdiction-Affect 55% of These Cases in Federal Court, Trial, April/May,
1966, p. 30.
2. Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest: A Plea for Its Abolition,
32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 926, 927 (1957).
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ger of law and equity, the Field Code of 1848 established a rule
applicable to both law and equity.3 The supposed objective of
the Code rule was to allow suits by assignees at law as well as
in equity. If this was the objective, the necessity for the rule is
questionable, since in 1848 assignees could sue at law in the name

of the assignor. In fact, assignees were then being denied the
right to sue in equity because of the existence of an adequate
remedy at law. 4 Perhaps the real utility of the 1848 Code rule
came to be the evasion of the common law rule which prohibited a party from testifying. By the use of an assignment, the
assignee became the "real party plaintiff," and the assignor was
able to testify as a nonparty. Once the rule disqualifying parties from testifying was abandoned, the real party rule became
substantially meaningless, reducible to the truism that the person who has the right of action ought to be the plaintiff.5
Nevertheless the rule persisted and evolved into Federal
Equity Rule 37, which was the forerunner of Rule 17 (a).6
Although the federal rule drafters recognized the rule was
"not a fortunate choice of expression," the authors felt that
since the words were common in state procedure, federal equity
practice, and numerous judicial decisions, they could serve as the
model for a unified procedure. 7 Even with the 1966 amendment,
Rule 17(a) remains substantially identical to the corresponding
provisions of the Field Code:
RULE

17. PARTIES PLAINDEFF AND
CAPACITY

.1. (a) REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.
3.

DEFENDANT;

Every action shall

FIRST REPORT OF NEW YoRx COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND

PLEADING 125 (1848). The relevant rules provided:
§ 91. Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest, except as otherwise provided in section 93.

§ 93. An executor or administrator, a trustee of an express

trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute, may sue
without joining with him the persons for whose benefit the suit
is prosecuted.
4. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 934-36. Apparently the Commission-ers were simply wrong in their appraisal of contemporary practice. See
LOUISELL & HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
-850 (1962). But see JAmEs, CIvm PROCEDURE § 9.2 (1965).
5. LouisSELL & HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 651-52.
6. The language of Rule 17(a), as adopted in 1938, was substantially identical to that of Equity Rule 37. 3 MOORE, FEhmEAL PRACTICE
§ 17.02 (1948).
"
7. ,Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J.
1291, 1311 (1935).
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2 be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest;
3

4t a An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee

4 of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name
5

a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or

6

party authorized by statute may sue in his own name

7 without joining with him the party for whose benefit the
8 action is brought; and when a statute of the United
9
10
11
12
13

States so provides, an action for the use or benefit
of another shall be brought in the name of the United
States. No action shall be dismissed on the ground
that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed

14 after objection for ratificationof commencement of the
15 action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party
16 in interest; and such ratification,joinder, or substitution
17 shall have the same effect as if the action had been
8
18 commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
The Advisory Committee's note characterized the 1966
change in line 3, ommitting "but," as affirming the view that
"the specific instances enumerated are not exceptions to, but
illustrations of the rule."9 The 1966 addition in lines 11 to 18
was originally developed by the Advisory Committee on Admiralty and, as first drafted, was limited to certain types of
admiralty actions. 10 Since the language fairly restated the ma8. The 1938 Rule is in regular type; 1966 omissions from the 1938
Rule are lined through; 1966 additions are in italics.
9. FED.R. Civ. P. 17(a), 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1966). The Advisory
Committee's note in summary states: (1) The specific enumeration
does not preclude the finding of the existence of other real parties;
(2) The term "bailee" is added primarily to preserve admiralty practice but need not be limited to it; (3) The provisions for amendment
are added in the interest of justice on the basis that the rule was originally intended as a permissive rule to allow an assignee to sue, and that
the only restrictive function that the rule now performs is to assure the
defendant that he will be protected by res judicata; (4) Provisions for
amendment back, however, are limited to good faith choices of plaintiff and are not meant to allow practices such as fictitious name suits
with joinder of the real party after the statute of limitations has run.
10. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts, reported in 34 F.R.D.
325, 341 (1964).
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jority practice and the better results in both civil actions and
admiralty," it was made applicable to all cases.
The federal courts have traditionally defined the phrase
"real party in interest" as meaning the person who, under the
applicable substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced. 12
Thus the real party is the one with legal power to control the
lawsuit and may be different from the person who will ultimately be benefited if the suit is successful.'8 In all cases not
involving a federal cause of action, the doctrine is that the substantive law of the state in which the federal court is sitting
must be applied to determine who has the right to enforce the
cause of action.' 4
Using the technical concept of legal power to control the
conduct of the lawsuit and to define the real party in interest
would appear to permit artificial assignments and other arrangements to disguise the identity of an unattractive plaintiff or to
create diversity jurisdiction. 15 However, the official theory is
that state policies invalidating champertous transfers and the
statutory prohibition against collusive creation of diversity"
17
adequately cure these evils.
The mechanical and legalistic nature of this definition of the
real party has a certain advantage. It allows a quick and certain determination of the identity of the real party without
lengthy factual inquiries into actual finance, control, and benefit. Perhaps, in this sense it performs the same function as the
fictional theories about the citizenship of corporations.' 8 However, the definitional categories approach has several drawbacks.
The rigidity of the categories makes them susceptible to manipulation to create or defeat diversity. Further, state legislative
and judicial changes affecting the categories leave much room for
uncertainty, especially in light of the wavy line between state
11.

See text accompanying notes 41..44 infra.

12. 3 MOORE,

FEDERAL PRACTICE f

17.07 (1948).

13. See, e.g., 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 17.12-.14 (1948).
14. E.g., McNeil Constr. Co. v. Livingston State Bank, 300 F.2d 88
(9th Cir. 1962); American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines,
Inc., 179 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1949). State procedural rules defining the
real party in interest must, of course, be ignored. American Fid. & Cas.
Co. v. All American Bus Lines, Inc., supra.
15. The citizenship of the real party in interest controls the determination of diversity. See notes 19-21 infra and accompanying text.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).

17.
18.

Clark & Moore, supra note 7, at 1311-12.
Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship

Jurisdiction:A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1426,

1449-51 (1964).
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substance and federal procedure.
B. RELATION TO DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
It has become generally recognized that the citizenship of
the real party in interest controls the determination of the existence of diversity.' 9 Even before the adoption of Rule 17(a)
in 1938, the Supreme Court had looked to the real party rules
existing in federal equity practice and typical state procedural
codes for the test to determine diversity. Thus the citizenship
of trustees, subrogees, executors, administrators, guardians, and
curators are usually controlling rather than that of beneficiaries,
subrogors, heirs, and wards. 20 If, however, under the applicable
state law a fiduciary has only a minimal degree of control over
the lawsuit, he is to be regarded as a formal or nominal party
of the beneficiary controls the determination
and the citizenship
21
of diversity.
C. RELATION TO PERSONS NEEDED FOR JUST

ADJUDICATION:

RuLE 19

As revised by the 1966 amendments, Rule 19 provides for the
joinder, in certain cases, of persons having an interest in the
subject matter of the litigation.2 2 Although the language and
underlying policies of Rules 17 and 19 overlap to some extent,
the relationship between the two rules has not been fully de19. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 17.04, at 1312 (1948). Professor
Atkinson cites Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 421 (1823), as
the first appearance of the real party terminology in diversity suits.

Atkinson, supra note 2, at 927. Professors Hart and Wechsler assert that
the division of parties into the categories, formal, proper, necessary and
indispensable, controls the determination of diversity. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 227, 907 (1953).
However, the authors do not reconcile these categories with the real
party concept.
20. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 17.04, at 1313-14. An assignee is
a real party in interest but the citizenship of the assignor controlled
under the now repealed assignee clause. Id. f 17.06, at 1324 (1948).
21. E.g., Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).
22. The 1938 version of Rule 19 was doctrinally subdivided into
three rules: First, suit could not go forward without the presence of
"indispensable" parties, and if their presence could not be obtained or
would defeat diversity, the suit had to be dismissed; Second, "necessary" parties would be added unless their presence was unobtainable or
would defeat diversity-in which case the suit would be continued without them; Third, "proper" parties might be allowed in at the discretion
of the court. The new Rule 19 abandons these rigid definitional categories and sets forth several factors to be considered by the court in
determining whether the suit may proceed without an absent party.
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veloped. 23
Rule 17 (a) provides that certain persons "may sue in [their]
own name[s] without joining with [them] the party for whose
benefit the action is brought." Since the persons specified are
examples of real parties, the rule implies that a real party in
interest may sue without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is brought. 24 However, even if the plaintiff is a real
party in interest, Rule 17(a) has not been found to preclude
the addition of another joint party plaintiff pursuant to Rule
19.25 Conversely, if a nonparty can be categorized as a real
party in interest, Rule 17(a) should not be construed to compel
joinder without reference to Rule 19. In sum, Rule 17(a) should
not be read as an absolute exception which allows exclusion or
compels joinder apart from Rule 19. Perhaps the inconsistencies
be reconciled by restating
between Rules 17 (a) and 19 could best 26
Rule 17 (a) as a permissive joinder rule.
D.

RELATION TO CAPACITY To SUE: RuLEs 17 (B) Am 17 (c)

Although it is said that there is a clear distinction between
real party in interest and capacity to sue,27 the underlying state
23. See Dunham v. Robertson, 198 F.2d 316, 319 (10th Cir. 1952);
Cobb v. National Lead Co., 215 F. Supp. 48, 50-51 (E.D. Ark. 1963);
Morelli v. Northwest Eng'r Corp., 30 F.R.D. 522 (E.D. Wis. 1962); cf.
Lumbermen's Mut. Gas Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1954). In
Koepp v. Northwest Freight Lines, 10 F.R.D. 524 (D. Minn. 1950), the
court at page 527 stated:

Rule 19(a) necessarily assumes that the parties who may be

joined under it as plaintiffs are real parties in interest. Otherwise, the rule would be inconsistent with the specific requirement of Rule 17. So the test for joinder set forth in Rule 19joint interest-is whether the parties to be joined are the real

parties in interest, and they are the real parties in interest when
they are necessary parties.
The articles originating and debating the 1966 reform of Rule 19 do
not reconcile its relation to Rule 17. Fink, Indispensable Partiesand the
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403 (1965);
Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural
Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1254 (1961); Reed, Compulsory Joinder of
Partiesin Civil Actions (pts. 1-2), 55 MicH. L. REv. 327, 483 (1957).
24. E.g., Imperial Appliance Corp. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 239 F.
Supp. 175 (E.D. Wis. 1965) (patent licensee subcontracting for benefit
of equitable owners of patent could sue without their joinder); Jenkins
v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 18 F.R.D. 267 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (insured subrogor as trustee need not join insurer).
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Sperling, 117 F. Supp. 781 (S.D. Cal. 1953),
aff'd in part, 237 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 354 U.S. 91 (1957);
Young v. Garrett, 149 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1945).
26. ATKINSON, supra note 2, at 964. This solution has been adopted
in New York. See note 182 infra.
Professor Wright
27. W cIGHT,
FEDFRAL CouRTs 258 n.16 (1963).
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policies regulating capacity can be viewed as coalescing with the
policies served by the real party in interest rule. Both the real
party rule and the regulation of the legal representation of minors, wards, incompetents, partnerships, and associations,
through the requirement of statutory qualifications, represent
attempts to protect the interests of creditors, the public, and persons affected by the court's action. The real party and capacity
requirements also protect the interest of the defendant by requiring a responsible party plaintiff against whom the rules of
res judicata can operate.
This overlap in policy is symbolized by cases which have
been criticized as confusing 17(a) and 17(b) by treating their
concepts as interchangeable. 28 Judge Biggs of the Third Circuit
has asserted that all the old Supreme Court learning about real
parties in interest is really a simple question of capacity to sue
under state law and that capacity determines diversity.29 Rule
17(a), in this view, is apparently nothing more than a directive
to be followed in entitling the complaint.
However, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between
the real party and capacity rules. The mechanics of raising objections under the two rules may not be identical.3 0 Further,
17(b) makes an explicit total reference to state law, whereas
only state substantive law is relevant to the application of
31
17(a).
E. RELATION TO CLASS SUITS AND INTERVENTION:

RULEs 23

AN 24

The policies supporting Rule 17(a), as well as those underlying Rules 17(b), 17(c), and 19, would in theory have equal
claim to regulating class actions.3 2 However, since the purpose
;f .the class action is to accommodate situations in which all percites Catalfano v. Higgins, 182 A.2d 637 (Del. Super. Ct. 1962), as discriminatingly distinguishing the concepts.
, - 28. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 27, at 258 n.15, citing E. Brooke Matlack, Inc. v. Walrath, 24 F.R.D. 263 (D. Md. 1959). See also Robertson
v. Malone, 190 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1951); Elliott v. Day, 218 F. Supp. 90
(D. Ore. 1962).
29. Fallat v. Govran, 220 F.2d 325, 327 (3d Cir. 1955).
30. See notes 41-44 infra and accompanying text.
31. However, Rule 17(a) does allow a "party authorized by statute"
to sue alone, thus conceivably referring to state procedural law as does
Rule 17 (b). Cf. Vroon v. Templin, 278 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1960).
32. Rule 23 was extensively revised by the 1966 amendments. The
former test based on abstract categories of rights was eliminated in favor
of one emphasizing pragmatic factors to be considered in allowing and
handling class suits. Advisory Committee's note, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp.
1966).
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sons interested in the action cannot, as a practical matter, be
present before the court, the class action rule must strike a
compromise between these policies and the needs of group litigation. Rule 23 thus is intended to provide a practical means to
insure adequate representation of and notice to absent interested persons, to protect the defendant and promote court efficiency through application of res judicata policy, to fashion a
and to distribute the costs and proworkable effective remedy,
33
ceeds of the litigation.

Rule 17(a) commands that "every action" shall be brought
in the name of the real party. Although no class action decision
has made explicit reference to Rule 17(a), it should apply to
class suits to test the status of the plaintiff as a true, legitimate
representative of the class he purports to represent.3 4 The real
party rule can also be utilized in testing the status of an intertrial where the intervenor
venor at the outset of a suit,35 or after
36
seeks to participate in the judgment.
F.

RELATION TO SUBSTITUTION:

RULE

25

Rule 25 has been relied on to avoid dismissal when, because
of an assignment subsequent to the commencement of the action,
37
the original plaintiff loses his status as real party in interest.

The same result has been extended to mistaken choices of the
real party plaintiff at the outset of the suit 33 and is codified in
the 1966 addition to Rule 17(a).3 9 Consistent with the liberal
amendment provisions of Rule 15, these rules reflect a policy
that the choice of plaintiff should not have to be made at the
risk of a procedural dismissal which may foreclose a new suit
because of the statute of limitations.40 While removal of the
33. Simeone, ProceduralProblems of Class Suits, 60 MIcu. L. Rsv.
905 (1962).
34. See Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 83-84 (D. Conn.
1958), rev'd, 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1959).
35. National Radio School v. Marlin, 83 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ohio
1949); cf. Grieves v. Levy, 238 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Il. 1965).
36. Celanese Corp. v. John Clark Indus., Inc., 214 F.2d 551, 556 (5th
Cir. 1954); Strate v. Niagara Mach. &Tool Works, 160 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.
Ind. 1958).
37. Unison Realty Corp. v. RKO Theatres, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 232 (S.D.
N.Y. 1964).
38. See Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953); Link Aviation,
Inc. v. Downs, 325 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
39. Lines 11-18 of Rule 17(a) as quoted in text of this article, at
note 8 supra. Rule 15(c) was also amended in 1966 to establish more
firmly the doctrine of relation back of amendments changing parties.
Moor, FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES PAMPHLmE

460-66 (1966).

40. Cf. De Franco v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 156 (S.D. Cal. 1955);
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dismissal sanction may encourage a strategic choice of plaintiff
since an unsuccessful selection may be corrected, the Advisory
Committee's note to Rule 17(a) indicates the court should not
tolerate abuses such as bad faith fictitious name suits.

II. CLAIMS MADE TO THE AUTHORITY OF RULE 17 (a)
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE DEFENDANT
In objecting that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the defendant may be motivated by a wide variety of strategical objectives. The defendant may be objecting legitimately
to claim protection of the policies underlying rules of res judicata
and indispensable parties, or rules as to capacity or champerty.
More indirectly, the defendant may be attempting to recast the
plaintiff to take advantage of statutes of limitations, service of
process requirements, or other procedural restrictions which will
end the suit. He may be attempting to limit the amount of damages by urging that they run to the nonparty. He may be seeking joinder of the absent person in order to make him a party
known to the jury so that its prejudice can operate in his favor.
And where the nonparty's citizenship will destroy diversity, the
defendant may be asserting his constitutionally protected interest not to be sued in federal court. Finally, along with such objectives actually sought in greater or lesser degrees of good faith
and hard fighting, he may be seeking strategic delay, harassment,
preservation of the record, and the creation of an issue for appeal.

B. MECHANICS OF OBJECTION
In the past, the defendant has usually asked for dismissal
first, and in the alternative, for joinder, on the grounds the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. The 1966 addition to Rule
17(a) precludes dismissal until a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted in the action. Any of these acts will have the same effect
as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real
party in interest.
Wallis v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 211 (E.D.N.C. 1952). Even without
the new amendments to Rules 17 and 15, the Tenth Circuit held that
substitution under Rules 25 and 15 related back for purposes of the
statute of limitations. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus
Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 851 (1951).
A caveat to this generally liberal approach is the troublesome provisions
of Rule 25(a) (1) covering the death of a party. See Note, Federal Civil
Procedure: Substitution Under Amended Rule 25(a)(1), 1963 DuxE L.J.
733.
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The present rules do not expressly provide for the timing of
a real party objection. However, Rule 9 (a) requires that an objection to capacity be raised by specific negative averment. This
requirement has been collaterally mentioned in finding a waiver
of 17(a) objections. 41 Conversely, although it may be raised on
motion, an objection to lack of an indispensable party under
Rule 19 is not waived and by Rule 12(h) (3) can be made at the
42
trial on the merits.
Although some authority to the contrary exists, failure to
raise a real party objection by pleading or motion is generally
held to constitute a waiver.43 Since the 1966 rule changes have
not specifically treated the problem, the best solution may be
to draw the closest analogy in each case to the waivable capacity
objection or the nonwaivable indispensable party objection and
to address the question of waiver and amendment to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Of course, this procedure does not
prevent the possibility that defendant's timely objection may be
successful only on appeal, and require dismissal for lack of diversity after the verdict.

44

The use of discovery tools to explore the factual control of
41.

United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Slifkin, 200 F. Supp. 563, 573-

74 (N.D. Ala. 1961) (objection waived when raised after trial); E. Brooke
Matlack, Inc. v. Walrath, 24 F.R.D. 263 (D. Md. 1959) (dictum).
42. A real party objection has been likened to an indispensable
party objection in order to overcome the argument that under Rule 12
it could not be raised by motion prior to the answer. See Kincaid v.
City of Anchorage, 15 FED. RULES SERV. 19a.1, Case 5 (D. Alaska 1951).
Similarly, a real party objection can be raised by answer and is not
waived by failure to raise in a pre-answer motion. See Ohmer Corp.
v. Duncan Meter Corp., 8 F.R.D. 582 (N.D. IM. 1948).
43. See Blau v. Lamb, 314 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
813 (1963) (dictum by Clark, J., calling it a matter of affirmative defense); National Garment Co. v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 173 F.2d
32 -(8th Cir. 1949) (dictum); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Slifkin,
200 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ala. 1961); McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Mach.
Co., 116 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 214 F.2d 608 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954); CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 34 (2d ed. 1947);
cf. Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, 187 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 828 (1951), modifying 88 F. Supp. 54 (S.D. Tex. 1949). But see
Clark v. Hutchison, 161 F. Supp. 35 (C.Z. 1957).
The timing of real party objections raises special difficulties because
such moves are often linked to procedural problems of diversity jurisdiction. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 719, 907-08 (1953); LOUISELL & HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 664-

65 (1962).
44. Thames v. Mississippi ex rel. Shoemaker, 117 F.2d 949 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 630 (1941)
itations had run).

(unclear whether statute of lim-
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the lawsuit has usually been freely yielded,45 but now and then
it is resisted. 46 Perhaps attorney-client privilege should yield in
the face of the need for facts with which to apply policies of
real party in interest rules. 47 However, wide discovery necessarily provides tools of delay for the defendant. 48 The importance of the question at the outset has occasioned the use of
interlocutory appeals,49 presenting another opportunity for delay to the defendant.
C.

OBJECTIVES IN RETAINING THE CHOSEN PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff's attorney may resist a real party objection simply
because he thinks the chosen plaintiff is entitled to an efficient
remedy without the presence of the nonparty who may be unwilling or unavailable. The attorney may be seeking a remedy
which substantive law denies to the nonparty but grants to his
plaintiff or, on the other hand, may be seeking to create a short
cut where formerly the remedy had run to the nonparty rather
than his plaintiff. He may be trying to avoid statutory restrictions directed against certain parties, or to shield his nonparty
from the jury. He may be deliberately trying to avoid the application of res judicata, thus keeping open the possibility of harassment through subsequent law suits by the nonparty against the
defendant. Finally, the original choice of plaintiff may have
been made to create or destroy diversity.

45. Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn. 1962),
aff'd, 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963) (admission of counsel); Condor Inv.
Co. v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 211 F. Supp. 671 (D. Ore. 1962)
(preliminary hearing); Northboro Apartments, Inc. v. Wheatland Tube
Co., 198 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Williams v. Union Pac. R.R., 14
FED. RULES SERV. 17a.14, Case 3 (D. Neb. 1950) (interrogatories).
46. E.g., Doherty v. Mutual Warehouse Co., 245 F.2d 609, 610 (5th
Cir. 1957) (inquiry into beneficial ownership of stock); Rackley v. Board
of Trustees of the Orangeburg Regional Hosp., 35 F.R.D. 516 (E.D.S.C.
1964) (resisted discovery into financing by NAACP); Arlington Glass
Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 24 F.R.D. 50 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (resisted
inquiry into financing of antitrust suit).
47. Hartmann Coal Mining Co. v. Hoke, 157 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Pa.
1957).
48. E.g., Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 83-84 (D.
Conn. 1958), rev'd, 270 F.2d 365, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1960).
49. Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 325 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).
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COURT RESPONSES TO 17(a) CLAIMS

WHERE CREATION OR DEFEAT OF DIvERsiTY JURISDICTION

IS

NOT AN OBJECT IN THE SELECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF

1. Insurance in General: Subrogorand Subrogee
When an insurance company pays a casualty claim to its
insured, a combination of statutory, contractual, and equitable
subrogation gives the insurance company the right to pursue the
insured's right to compensation against third parties. If the insured has been totally compensated for his loss, he is factually
disinterested in pursuing the claim further. If, however, he has
been only partially compensated, he is still interested in advancing the claim. In either situation, the insurance company typically wishes to stay out of any litigation as plaintiff in order to
avoid jury prejudice. The insured, if only partially compenstated, may share this nondisclosure motivation. ° Even if the
insurance company is joined as plaintiff, the judge may keep its
presence unknown to the jury.5 1 However, the courts and legal
commentators indicate that, in practice, disclosure follows joinder. In addition, although modern juries may assume the defendant is covered by insurance, it is less likely that the jury will
assume that an insurance company is behind the plaintiff.
In any event, when the suit is brought in the name of the
insured alone, the defendant may either move to dismiss the action or to join the insurance company. As an appeal to a common sense principle that all interested parties ought to join, the
argument has merit. The insurance company will benefit from
any recovery, may bear the litigation expense, and may control
the case by exerting at least a second chair influence on the
conduct of the trial. However Rule 17(a) does not recognize
such realities but depends more upon technical legal categorizations. Thus in anticipation of the objection by the defendant,
the insurers have devised insurance contracts and settlement pro50. However, a field study of jury behavior indicates that in some
situations it may be advantageous for the plaintiff to have his subrogated
insurer joined. While the strategists are correct in assuming that the
jury is generally prejudiced against the insurance company, the jury
may reason that they must award liberally in order to benefit the individual plaintiff over and above the amount that will go to his subrogated insurer. Broeder, The Pro and Con of Interjecting Plaintiff In-

surance Companies in Jury Trial Cases: An Isolated Jury Project Case
Study, 6 NATURAL REsouncFs J. 269 (1966).
51. See interview with Judge Ford of the Eastern District of Ken-

tucky, in Note, Civil Procedure:Insurance Companies as Real Parties in
Interest, 46 Ky. L.J. 252, 259 n.25 (1958).

19671

REAL PARTY RULE

cedures which attempt to preclude their being held real parties
in interest.
Under the "loan receipt" arrangement, the insured is not
"paid" but "loaned" the amount of his loss, with the loan being
conditionally repayable out of any recovery against the third
party. Many state court decisions have held such arrangements
effective to keep the insurer out of the litigation.5 2 These decisions are often justified in terms of the state's real party in interest rule and its subrogation jurisprudence. In the federal
courts this question has proved more complex. 53 The federal
judge may, for example, find that state law allows or disallows
the insurance company to avoid joinder and reach the same result under Rule 17(a). However, the court may find that Rule
17(a) requires a different result from that which would be arrived at in a state court. Where the citizenship of the insurance
company will destroy diversity, the federal judge will have the
additional alternative of refusing joinder of the insurance company as a merely necessary party or of forcing dismissal by calling it indispensable. In any event, federal judges must attempt
54
to reconcile their decisions with United States v. Aetna Cas. Co.
a. The Supreme Court Gloss:

United States v. Aetna Cas-

ualty Co.
In 1853 Congress passed a statute which, in substance, pro5
hibited assignment of claims against the United States.r Incor-

porating the general common law policies against assignments,
the purpose of the statute was to protect the federal government
against splitting of claims and multiple litigation and liability,
to preserve its defenses, counterclaims, and venue protection,
and to allow simplicity of accounting. 6
In 1946 the Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted, waiving
States and making it
the sovereign immunity of the United
57
liable for the torts of its employees.
Cases immediately arose where a person, who had been injured through the negligence of a government employee, was
then partially or totally compensated by an insurance company.
52. See Note, supra note 51.
53. See Kessner, Federal Court Interpretationsof the Real Party
in Interest Rule in Cases of Subrogation, 39 NEE. L. REv. 452 (1960).
54.

338 U.S. 366 (1949).

55.

10 Stat. 170 (1853).

56.

338 U.S. at 371.

57. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1965).
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In such cases insurance companies commonly brought suit
against the United States in their own names as subrogees. In
moving for dismissal, the United States generally raised two arguments: The Anti-Assignment Act prohibited the subrogation of the insurer to the insured's claim against the United
States; and the insurer was not the real party in interest under
Rule 17(a). The Supreme Court rejected both arguments holding that the Anti-Assignment Act did not prohibit "assignments
by operation of law," which included subrogation, and that the
insurer, as a subrogee, was a real party in interest. The four
cases in issue before the Court-and the unappealed cases from
seven circuits-involved various combinations of total or partial
subrogation and one or two plaintiffs. Speaking to these situations, the Supreme Court, in Aetna, held:
If the subrogee has paid an entire loss suffered by the insured,

it is the only real party in interest and must sue in its own
name. * * * If it has paid only part of the loss, both the insured
and the insurer have substantive rights against
the tortfeasor
58
which qualify them as real parties in interest.

With respect to the partial subrogation situation, the Court further pointed out that the United States could compel joinder of
both parties because each is a "necessary" party.59
Questions immediately arose as to the scope of the Aetna
holding. Should the Supreme Court's statement be considered
an invariable part of Rule 17(a), applicable to all diversity cases
despite state law; or should it be narrowly limited to claims
against the government or, at least, to claims not based on
diversity?
The Fifth Circuit when faced with this problem ignored
Aetna in holding that subrogated fire insurance companies conducting the litigation for the insured plaintiff were not joinable
as either necessary or indispensable parties.6 0 The court relied
on the 1918 Supreme Court decision of Luckenbach v. W. J.
McCahan Sugar Ref. Co.61 and Texas decisions upholding the
validity of "loan receipt" insurance settlements. The Fifth Cir58. 338 U.S. at 380.
59. 338 U.S. at 380-82.
60. Celanese Corp. v. John Clark Indus., Inc., 214 F.2d 551 (5th Cir.
1954). See also Watsontown Brick Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 201 F.
Supp. 343 (M.D. Pa. 1962), following the same line.
61. 248 U.S. 139 (1918). The Fifth Circuit also cited three post1938 federal cases reaching the same result: Augusta Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 170 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1948) (federal tort claim); Dixey
v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 132 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1942);
Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Word, 131 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1942).
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cult later distinguished Aetna by holding that it dealt only
with the Anti-Assignment Act and did not involve loan receipt
settlements. 62 Thus the substantive right of the insurance company under a loan receipt as characterized by state law apparently determines that it is not a real party under Rule 17 (a).
Another justification for refusing joinder of partial subrogee
63
insurers is found in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Falkingham.
While admitting the question was one of federal procedure under
Rule 17(a), Judge Donovan distinguished Aetna on the ground
that the Supreme Court there was speaking only of cases in
which the insurer was a plaintiff and not of those in which the
insured sued for the whole loss alone. In the latter case there
was no good reason to join the insurer since all defenses were
available to defendant and res judicata would protect him from
another suit.
b. Workman's Compensation Subrogee as Nonparty:

Em-

ployee as Plaintiff
(1)

Joinder Refused

State workmen's compensation statutes provide various
schemes for subrogation by the insurer to the rights of the injured employee. Typically they may provide a lien or judgment
in favor of the insurer on any recovery by the employee against
a third party to the extent of the compensation paid by the insurer and, in the event of inaction by the insured for a period of
a year, an assignment of his claim against the third party to the
insurance company. Several federal courts have relied on statutes of this type in denying joinder of the insurer, despite the
language in Aetna. An oft-cited example is Jenkins v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.,64 which held that the Supreme Court in Aetna
had not defined "trustee of an express trust" in Rule 17(a)
62. Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp. v. Lawson, 271 F.2d 259 (5th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); cf. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v.
Russom, 241 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1957).
63. 20 F.R.D. 141 (D. Minn. 1957). By following Judge Donovan's
theory, it has been concluded that the subrogee is a real party in interest,
but need not be joined because he is neither indispensable, nor even necessary. Wright v. Schebler Co., 37 F.R.D. 319 (S.D. Iowa 1965).
64. 18 F.R.D. 267 (W.D. Mo. 1955); see Pyle v. Kansas Gas & Elec.
Co., 23 F.R.D. 148 (D. Kan. 1959) (same result under Kansas statute);
Clark v. Hutchison, 161 F. Supp. 35 (C.Z. 1957) (joinder refused under
Harbor Worker's Comp. Act); Shumate v. Wahlers, 19 F.R.D. 173 (E.D.
Mich. 1956) (same result under Michigan statute, but see note 69 infra);
Oliff v. Mount Vernon Seminary, Inc., 22 FED. RULEs SEmv. 17a.14, Case
2 (D.D.C. 1956) (loan receipt).
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and that a compensated employee may qualify as such under
Missouri law. Thus Rule 17(a) allowed the employee to sue
without joining the insurer who is the beneficiary of the trust.
The victory for the insurer may have been pyrrhic because the
court went on to direct that at the trial defendant must be
allowed to show the jury the interest of the insurance company
in.the plaintiff's claim, since the rules of evidence admit proof
of the identity of beneficiaries in suits by the trustee.6 5
Strate v. NiagaraMach. Co. 66 shows another, more effective,
bypass of Aetna. Judge Stoeckler there denied joinder of the
insurer, holding that an Indiana statute providing that the in67
surer "may at anytime intervene in the [employee's] action,"
gave the insurance carrier the total choice of entry, not compellable by the defendant. The court found that the insurer
was not yet a real party in interest but only a "potential real
party in interest" because the carrier would not have any vested
rights until after a recovery by the employee. 68 After the jury's
verdict the insurer was allowed to intervene so that its interests
could be protected in all post-judgment proceedings. The result
represents maximum success in jury avoidance.
(2)

Conditional Joinder Ordered

Only by straining the distinctions of state law can the above
cases refusing joinder be reconciled with those that order joinder.
In Smallwood v. Days Transfer, Inc., 69 for example, the court
65. 18 F.R.D. at 270; see Wright v. Schebler Co., 37 F.R.D. 319, 322
(S.D. Iowa 1965), where the court classified the insurer as a real, nonnecessary, nonjoinable party, but went on to say: "It would appear that
the defendants, at the time of trial, would be entitled to indicate the
interest of [the subrogee] in the plaintiff's claim"; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 166 F. Supp. 11 (W.D. Pa. 1958)
(indicating disclosure despite nonjoinder).
66. 160 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Ind. 1958).
67. IND. ANx. STAT. § 40-1213 (1929).
68. An Illinois statute has been similarly construed. King v. Cairo
Elks Home Ass'n, 145 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. Ill. 1956); see Wright v. Schebler Co., 37 F.R.D. 319 (S.D. Iowa 1965); Race v. Hay, 28 F.R.D. 354 (N.D.
Ind. 1961); Horwich v. Price, 25 F.R.D. 500 (W.D. Mich. 1960).
69. 165 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Mich. 1958). Compare Dinardo v. Consumers Power Co., 181 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1950) (dismissing employee's
suit on grounds contemporary Michigan statute required election between tort and compensation remedy), with Shumate v. Wahlers, 19
F.R.D. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1956) (refusing joinder under the Michigan statute as amended in 1952). See Poleski v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 21
F.R.D. 579 (D. Md. 1958) (joinder ordered); Du Vaul v. Miller, 13 F.R.D.
197 (W.D. Mo. 1952) (joinder ordered); Koepp v. Northwest Freight
Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 524 (D. Minn. 1950) (joinder ordered under Wis-
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concluded that under Michigan law the insurer is "manifestly a
real party in interest" and that federal procedure requires its
joinder as a necessary party if jurisdiction or venue will not be
defeated. The decisions refusing joinder, it was said, misconstrue the old "but" clause of Rule 17(a) as an absolute exception
to Rule 19.
In the cases analyzed above, the defendant raised the issue
0
the
before trial. However, in Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbriton,7
defendant apparently made no motion to join the insurer until
a $125,000 verdict had been returned in favor of the employee.
On appeal the insurer was found to be a real party in interest.
Since it had not been joined, the amount awarded by the jury
was reduced by the amount of the subrogation claim of $13,000.
If, in fact, the defendant did not raise the real party objection
prior to trial, it should have been held waived. On its apparent
facts the Sunray result would require the insurer to join voluntarily at the outset. If it does not so join, the award may be
reduced by the amount of 1its claim and it will be forced to
other remedies, if available.7
Braun v. Hassenstein Steel Co.72 reached a hybrid result.
The Minnesota workmen's compensation statute was found to
allow the employee to sue for his personal injuries without joining the insurance company. However, the Minnesota statute,
which places open-ended liability on the employer for medical
expenses, was held to give the employer a "separate additional
cause of action" for medical expenses. Thus the court required plaintiff to amend his complaint to state two separate
causes of action. Joinder of the insurer was ordered as to the
claim for medical expenses only.73
An additional problem may arise from the provision, common to workmen's compensation statutes, causing an automatic
consin statute; disapproved in Braniff Airways v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D.
141 (D. Minn. 1957)). Consistent with the above analysis categorizing
the subrogee as a necessary party, its joinder was refused where its
presence would destroy diversity. Morelli v. Northwest Eng'r Corp.,
30 F.R.D. 522 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (Michigan law applied).
70. 187 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 828 (1951).
71. See parallel problem of strategy in E. Brooke Matlack, Inc. v.
Walrath, 24 F.R.D. 263 (D. Md. 1959).
72. 21 F.R.D. 343 (D.S.D. 1958).
73. This result creates speculation as to whether the causes were in
fact tried together or presented to the same jury. The plaintiff also
argued that if joinder were to be ordered, the party joined should be
only the employer and not his insurer because the statutory subrogation
runs only to the "employer." This was summarily rejected on the basis
that Minnesota had equated the carrier with the employer.
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assignment to the employer if the employee fails to initiate suit
within a designated period of time, usually one year. If suit is
brought in the name of the employee more than one year after
the claim accrues, it is subject to dismissal.74 However, perhaps this defect may be cured by a reassignment of the claim
75
back to the employee.
(3)

Employee's Wrongful Death Administrator as Plaintiff

Where the employee has died as a result of the industrial
accident, a new factor is added. Wrongful death and survivor
statutes commonly designate the proper person to initiate suit
on the cause of action created by the statute. In Carlson v.
Consumer Power Co.,76 an insurance carrier had paid compensation to family members who were claiming as beneficiaries in
a wrongful death action. The court found that the right of the
insurer, under Michigan law, to a lien on the judgment made it
"manifestly a real party in interest" and ordered joinder. Cases
not requiring joinder were again labeled misconstructions of the
77
former "but" clause in Rule 17 as an exception to Rule 19.
74. Hebia v. Select Lake Shore Operating Co., 14 FED. RULES SEmV.
17a.11, Case 1 (N.D. Ill. 1950) (dismissing employee's suit because one
year lapse had automatically assigned claim to employer).
75. Thus, a federal court concluded under New York Workmen's
Compensation law: (a) the sole plaintiff employee had lost his right by
automatic statutory assignment to the employer because of a one year
lapse in bringing suit and the suit would be subject to dismissal, but
(b) the employer had assigned the right back to the employee, thus reviving his status as real party, and (c)the employer could now intervene to protect its interest despite passage of a two year statute of limitations on torts. Magee v. McNany, 13 FED. RuLEs SERV. 15a.3, Case 1
(W.D. Pa. 1950). It has been asserted that workmen's compensation carriers, in order to avoid being plaintiff in employee suits, cannot use the
"loan receipt" settlement device because they have an absolute statutory
duty to pay. Kessner, Federal Court Interpretations of the Real Party
in Interest in Cases of Subrogation,39 NEB. L. REV.452, 470 (1960). However, a loan receipt was successfully used in Oliff v. Mount Vernon Seminary, Inc., 22 FED. RULES SERV. 17a.14, Case 2 (D.D.C. 1956) and Horwich
v. Price, 25 F.R.D. 500 (W.D. Mich. 1960), Tinker v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 11 F.R.D. 540 (N.D. Ohio 1951), and Magee v. McNany, supra, indicate that an assignment back may accomplish the same purpose.
76. 164 F. Supp. 692 (W.D.Mich. 1957). See Maryland ex rel.
Carson v. Acme Poultry Corp., 9 F.R.D. 687 (D. Del. 1949); Carlson v.
Glenn L. Martin Co., 103 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
77. The decisions granting conditional joinder were approved in an
excellent analysis by Judge Winter who carefully examined whether in
a state court on the same facts the insurer would have to be joined.
Maryland ex rel. Geils v. Baltimore Transit Co., 37 F.R.D. 34 (D. Md.
1965) (construing Maryland procedure and conflicts rule and New York
compensation law).

1967]

REAL PARTY RULE

However, in Boeing Airplane Co. v. Perry,78 the Tenth Circuit,
relying on the Kansas wrongful death statute allowing suits by
an administrator, held that the subrogee (the United States)
need not be joined. The case is perhaps distinguishable, however, because it involved a federal employee and federal compensation.
c.

Casualty Insured as Plaintiff, Casualty Insurer Subrogee
as Nonparty
Where a workmen's compensation statute is not involved,
the insurance company typically relies on its method of settlement to argue that state decisions or statutes remove it from
the real party in interest category. The majority of decisions,
however, rely on Aetna to conclude that once state law gives
the subrogee substantial rights, it is then a real party in interest
under Rule 17(a) and will be conditionally joined as a necessary
party under Rule 19.
(1) Joinder Ordered
Hughey v. Aetna Cas. Co. 79 is an excellent recent example
which fully discusses the majority view. The plaintiff had
been injured in an auto accident and had been fully compensated by his insurance company. The defendant third party
moved for dismissal or joinder, asserting that the insurer was the
real party in interest. The court recognized that Delaware common law practice required the suit to be brought in the state
court only in the name of the insured, even in cases of total
subrogation. Nevertheless, the court read Aetna and Rule 17(a)
as requiring joinder in the interest of uniform federal procedure.80
78. 322 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964).

Here the widow beneficiary assigned her claim to the United States after

the action was initiated in return for compensation payments for loss
of her Air Force husband. See also Louisville & N.R.R. v. Rochelle, 252
F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1958) (court refused joinder of United States as subrogee to widow of a postman; Aetna and Rule 17 (a) do not control direct
provisions of the Federal Employee's Compensation Act); Tinker v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 540 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (where subsequent to motion for joinder of employer, employer assigned subrogation
claim back to personal representative).

79. 32 F.R.D. 340 (D. Del. 1963).

Compare Catalfano v. Higgins,

54 Del. 548, 188 A.2d 357 (1962), reversing dismissal of suit after verdict
in favor of insured where trial judge reasoned that subrogee was sole
real party in interest.
80. A leading case construing Aetna to require joinder of the partial subrogee despite state practice to the contrary is Gas Serv. Co. v.
Hunt, 183 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1950). See Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d
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The plaintiff in McNeil Constr. Co. v. Livingston State
Bank,8 ' had been fully compensated by a surety company for
bad check losses. The court found that the "loan receipt settlement" did not make the insured plaintiff a "trustee of an express
trust" and labeled the settlement a "payment" rather than a
"loan." Montana case law indicating a contrary result was
held to be "procedural." The court went one step beyond the
82
Hughey decision by granting defendant's motion to dismiss.
In Brown v. Fisher Skylights, Inc.,8 3 the insurer argued that its
status as partial rather than total subrogee should distinguish
Aetna. However, the New York federal court said Aetna and
Rule 19 still required joinder as a necessary party.
An interesting judicial reaction to the "loan agreement" settlement is found in Condor Inv. Co. v. Pacific Coca-ColaBottling
Co. 84 Judge Kilkenny first stated that he was bound by Oregon
decisions upholding the validity of loan agreements. However,
he then commented that he had been counsel for insurance companies and felt the loan agreements were merely shams. He
concluded from a lengthy factual examination of the settlement
transaction that the parties intended. "payment" rather than a
loan and gave the plaintiff ten days to join the insurance company. Thus, despite his inclination to follow Oregon law, the
judge reached the opposite result, requiring joinder, by turning
to the facts.

890 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 812 (1960); National Garment Co.
v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 173 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949) (dictum); East-

man Kodak Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 34 F.R.D. 490 (D. Md.
1964) (excess insurers had to be joined in suit brought in name of insured against prime insurer); Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. Rohwer, 172
F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1959) (where no loan receipt was mentioned,
joinder of partial subrogee on property damage claim was ordered under
Colorado law).
81. 185 F. Supp. 197 (D. Mont. 1960), ajf'd, 300 F.2d 88 (9th Cir.
1962).

82. To the same effect, American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All American
Bus Lines, 179 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1949), but note that after reversal, the
trial court successfully allowed substitution of the insurer and entered
judgment for the new plaintiff. 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 851 (1951).
83. 31 F.R.D. 532 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); see also Northboro Apartments,
Inc. v. Wheatland Tube Co., 198 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Pa. 1961), where the
court ordered joinder of the casualty insurer and rejected former § 210
of the New York Civil Practice Act expressly allowing suit by the insured alone as-being "procedural."
84. 211 F. Supp. 671 (D. Ore. 1962).
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(2) Joinder Refused
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Slifkin,5 recently restated
the principle that Aetna requires joinder only if the insurer
has paid the insured. The court found that Luckenbach v.
W. J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co.,8 6 which prior to the federal rules
upheld the validity of "loan receipt" settlements, is still applicable as a matter of federal law without reference to state substantive law.

Other courts follow a theory more in tune with the Erie
doctrine by upholding loan agreements on the basis of state law.
The insurance company successfully avoided joinder in Petrikin
v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R.s7 by assigning back to the insured all
its subrogation rights "for purposes of collection, suit and action" with the understanding the insured would pay back all
sums recovered to the extent of payment. The court applied
Missouri law recognizing assignments for collection and concluded that the insurance company was not a real party in interest. The "loan agreement" escape of Aetna is also used by casualty insurersss
d. Other Insurance Situations
In contrast to the foregoing discussion, there are situations
where the defendants resist, rather than force, the entry of the
85. 200 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ala. 1961); see Williams v. Union Pac.

R.R., 14 FED. RULES SERV. 17a.14, Case 3 (D. Neb. 1950) (relying on Luckenbach and Nebraska law); Capo v. C-O Two Fire Equip. Co., 93 F. Supp.
4 (D.N.J. 1950); cf. Perrera v. Smolowitz, 11 F.R.D. 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
86. 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
87. 15 F.R.D. 346 (W.D. Mo. 1954). See also Colorado Milling &
Elevator Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 F.R.D. 191 (W.D. Mo. 1951)
(refusing joinder on ground Missouri law allows suit by assignee or representative without joinder of beneficiary); Merriman v. Cities Serv. Gas
Co., 11 F.R.D. 165 (S.D. Mo. 1951) (refusing joinder on grounds insured
is "trustee of an express trust").
88. Watsontown Brick Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 201 F. Supp. 343
(M.D. Pa. 1962); cf. Johnston v. Timber Structures, Inc., 33 F.R.D. 25
(E.D. Pa. 1963), where the insurer had waived all subrogation rights, its
joinder could not be forced; -further, this did not reduce the plaintiff's
damage claim despite defendant's theory that the plaintiff would be-unjustly enriched if allowed both insurance compensation and full recovery. The nonjoinder theory of the Middle District in the Watsontown
case seems at odds with that of the Eastern District which refused to
apply the New York State nonjoinder result in federal court because the
New York rule was "procedural." Northboro Apartments, Inc. v.
Wheatland Tube Co., 198 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Pa. 1961). For a theory of
reconciliation, see Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 135 F.
Supp. 465 (W.D. Mo. 1955) discussed in text accompanying note 95 infra.
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insurance company. In E. Brooke Matlack, Inc. v. Walrath, 9 the
plaintiff successfully moved for joinder of its own subrogees
over the defendant's objection. The reverse strategy motivation
apparently stemmed from the defendant's claim that he was
entitled to coverage by the same insurance policies under which
the plaintiff had been compensated. The court wisely conditioned the entry of the insurer on the preservation of all the
defendant's claims to coverage by the insurer. However, in
Pure Oil Co. v. Geotechnical Corp.9 0 intervention of the plaintiff's subrogee was denied. Defendant, the indemnitor of the
plaintiff, apparently hoped that by keeping the partial subrogee
out of the action the amount of recoverage damages could be
reduced.9 1 The court, although rejecting intervention, held that
the plaintiff would be entitled to full recovery and would subsequently owe its insurer under equitable principles.
Another variation occurs where both plaintiff and defendant
resist entry by the subrogee of the plaintiff. Faced with this
problem, the Maryland federal court has decided that the settlement of an automobile suit between the insured and the defendant could not prejudice the rights of the subrogated collision insurer to intervene, even though the claim was less than
92

the jurisdictional amount.
Other mutations occur. 3 For example, two insurance companies were potentially obligated to coverage of the same automobile accident. The first insurer settled under a loan receipt
agreement with the injured party and then promoted suit in the
94
injured party's name as plaintiff against the second insurer.
89. 24 F.R.D. 263 (D. Md. 1959). See also Celanese Corp. v. John
Clark Indus., Inc., 214 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1954), where the defendant first
unsuccessfully moved for joinder of the subrogee, and then after verdict
unsuccessfully resisted the subrogee's intervention. The appellate court
termed the intervention "improper" but unprejudicial. Kansas Elec.
Power Co. v. Janis, 194 F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1952) (substitution of insurer
subrogee after statute of limitations had run).
90. 129 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. La. 1955).
91. Similar motivation seems present in the defendant railroad's
choice not to demand joinder of a shipper's subrogee in order to reduce
damages by relying on a so-called "benefit of insurance" clause. National
Garment Co. v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 173 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949).
92. Maryland ex rel. Scott v. Taylor, 140 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1956).
93. E.g., Perrera v. Smolowitz, 11 F.R.D. 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1951), where
the plaintiff and defendant insureds remained the real parties in interest
under loan receipts from three insurance companies on both sides of the
litigation. Thus the objection to plaintiff's splitting of property claims
into one for tractor and one for trailer was waived by defendant's two
year delay in raising it.
94. Unitqd Serv, Auto. Ass'n v. Russom, 241 F.2d 296, 301 (5th Cir.
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The Fifth Circuit, which respects loan receipt agreements, refused joinder of the first insurer. Another example occurred
where a New York bailor of diamonds had been fully compensated by its insurer for a bailee loss occurring in a Missouri
hotel. The insurer unsuccessfully attempted to sue in the bailee's name alone. 95 The strain put on the Erie doctrine by the
court in this case became severe. Under Missouri law the bailee
had the substantive right to sue as a trustee for the bailor but
was subject to all defenses which could be raised against the
bailor. Under Missouri conflicts law the effect of the loan receipt was governed by the law of the place of its execution,
New York. The court found that New York substantive law
recognized the validity of loan receipts only when the insurance
policy provided for such a means of settlement. Since the insurance policy involved made no mention of loan receipt settlement, the insurer was found to be the real party in interest.
Since suit could not be brought in the name of the bailor, it
could not be brought by the bailee. The 1950 amendment to
the New York real party rule, Section 210 of its Civil Practice
Act, allowing insureds to sue without joining the insurer was
held to be "adjective and procedural" and "cannot affect the
matter of who owns the cause of action or can assert it in a
Federal court in Missouri, as the real party in interest under
Rule 17(a).""6
2. NonresidentAdministratoras Plaintiff: Wrongful Death
The various types of general and special administrators for
decedents' estates and wrongful death actions are recognized by
the specific language of Rule 17(a) and by most states as being
real parties in interest who need not join the heirs, beneficiaries
1957). Contra, Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
34 F.R.D. 490 (D. Md. 1964); Neighbours v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co.,
169 F. Supp. 368 (D. Md. 1959), where the first insurer loaned money to
the insured to settle the claim of a third party and then attempted to
bring suit in the insured's name against the second insurer, joinder of
the first insurer was ordered.
95. Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 135 F. Supp. 465
(W.D. Mo. 1955); see McDaniel v. Durst Mfg. Co., 184 F. Supp. 430
(D.D.C. 1960).
96. Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., supra note 95 at
467. In a converse strategy situation, the same New York Civil Practice
Act was apparently treated as substantive where' a totally subrogated
company attempted to sue alone and was forced to join the insured because it had used a loan receipt settlement. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.

Commercial Union Assur. Co., 131 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. ,1955).
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or subrogees as parties plaintiff.9 7 Problems arise, however, in
two situations: first, cases in which, because of the rule that the
administrator's citizenship controls, diversity jurisdiction could
be defeated by appointment or joinder or consideration of an administrator of different citizenship; and second, cases in which
the objection is that the nonresident fiduciary lacks capacity
under Rule 17(b) by the law of the forum state and is not
qualified to maintain the suit. Rule 17(a) is on occasion irrelevantly interjected into what are primarily capacity cases.9 8
3. Transfer of Claims in General
a.

Transferee as Plaintiff

This section treats those cases where objection is raised by
the defendant that the plaintiff's claim is defective because the
nonparty who created in the plaintiff the right sought to be
enforced--or transferred to the plaintiff the realty, personalty
or chose in action involved in the suit-is actually the real party
in interest. In the past the defendant has usually sought dismissal, rather than joinder. The reason for selection of the plaintiff without joinder of the nonparty may vary from unavailability or refusal of the nonparty to join, to the simple convenience
or blunder of the attorney in choosing to bring the suit in
the name of the plaintiff alone. The defendant's claims can
usually be analyzed as an assertion that the plaintiff has no
claim on the merits or that there are no damages, that the nonparty is an indispensable party, or that policies of res judicata
require the nonparty's joinder.
The judicial responses commonly turn to the state substantive law to examine the nature of the transfer giving rise to the
plaintiff's claim and generally indicate that both the plaintiff
and the nonparty are real parties in interest. Thus, joinder,
rather than dismissal, is the more frequent result. The 1966
addition to Rule 17 (a) reflects this practice.
97. McElroy v. Security Nat'l Bank, 215 F. Supp. 775 (D. Kan.
1963). But see Supine v. Compagnie Natinale Air France, 100 F. Supp.
214 (E.D.N.Y. 1951), where a New York executor, alleging a Portuguese
wrongful death action, was required to join the beneficiaries as plaintiffs
despite the provision of Rule 17(a) that an executor may sue alone. On
workmen's compensation subrogees in wrongful death actions, see text
accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
98. Some of these cases are analyzed in the next major section,
covering situations where diversity is at stake. See text accompanying
notes 138-45 infra. All of these cases will be treated in a subsequent
article concerning capacity and Rule 17(b).
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The cases resulting in outright dismissal are rare and are
based on the total invalidity of the transfer under state law.
In one case a deed to the plaintiff was invalidated as being
without consideration." In another the assignment to the plaintiff of a tort claim for conversion was found ineffective, 10 0 and
in yet another the assignment of warranty claims from injured
third parties to the buyer plaintiff was held to be a nullity.10'
The majority of cases have, however, refused to dismiss the
complaint on an objection that the plaintiff is not the real party
in interest. Since often both the plaintiff and the nonparty are
factually interested and legally real parties, it is not surprising
that the courts show impatience with the objection as a technical
bar to a meritorious claim. 02 Judge Clark recognized this policy
in upholding the right of the purchaser to sue the carrier for
damaged goods without joining the mesne brokers in concluding,
"irrespective of niceties of 'title,' libelant was clearly the beneficial owner.' ' 0 3 The many other cases refusing dismissal show
99. Archie v. Shell Oil Co., 110 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1953). This
was a suit to test title to oil property. The court stated that the transfer
of title from the nonparty to the plaintiff, a casual laborer in the employ
of the lawyer bringing the suit, was a mere "simulation for the convenience" of parties in bringing the law suit. In dismissing the suit, the
court apparently was condemning the lawyer for maintenance.
100. Farm Bureau Co-op Mill & Supply, Inc. v. Blue Star Foods,
Inc., 238 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1956). The Arkansas Farm Bureau took a
chattel mortgage and a note from Watson so he could purchase and
raise chickens. Watson sold them for a worthless check to a confidence
man who immediately resold to the defendant. In a suit by the assignee
of the Farm Bureau's interest, the defendant won on the merits because
any liens were waived by the Farm Bureau's act of giving Ottis possession of the chickens and power of sale. But in dicta the court stated
that the assignment of the note and mortgage after the property had
been taken did not operate to assign the tort cause of action for conversion, and that the plaintiff was thus not the real party in interest. The
res judicata effect of this decision in a subsequent suit by the assignor
is thus questionable. See Ishmael v. City Elec. of Anchorage, Inc., 91
F. Supp. 688 (D. Alaska 1950) (personal injury action not assignable
under Alaskan law; dismissed without prejudice).
101. McDaniel v. Durst Mfg. Co., 184 F. Supp. 430 (D.D.C. 1960).
The plaintiff plumber had purchased propane gas from the defendant.
After an explosion causing damage to property owners, the plaintiff had
agreed with the insurers of the owners to sue the defendant in his own
name for breach of warranty and to hold the money in trust for their
benefit. In dismissing the plumber's claim for damages to the premises,
the court concluded that the law of privity gave the owners no action
of warranty against the remote supplier and the attempted assignment
to the plumber was of a nonexistent claim.
102. Kilbourn v. Western Sur. Co., 187 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1951).
103. Zack Metal Co. v. The S.S. Birmingham City, 291 F.2d 451, 453
(2d Cir. 1961).
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an amazing variety of reasons why the attorney for the plaintiff
04
did not join the nonparty in the first place.
b. Transferor or Other Party to Multiple Party Transaction
as Plaintiff
When a transferor sues without joining the transferee, the
defendant will often demand dismissal on the ground that the
plaintiff transferor is not the real party in interest, citing cases
in which courts have categorized the transferee as the real party
in interest. Though there have been dismissals in such cases, 0 5
both plaintiff and nonparty are usually considered real parties

08

104. Prudential Oil & Minerals Co. v. Hamlim, 277 F.2d 384 (10th Cir.
1960)

(assignments of claims by corporation to promoter-sole owner

after suit initiated); Doherty v. Mutual Warehouse Co., 245 F.2d 609 (5th
Cir. 1957) (suit to compel corporate dividends permitted by "shareholder of record" who was attorney holding title for beneficial owner);
Robertson v. Malone, 190 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1951) (statutory liquidator
of insurance company was real party in interest on suit to recover premiums); Harmon v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prods. Corp., 227
F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1964) (individual assignee from five different employees of claims for breach of collective bargaining agreement); United
States v. Tyler, 220 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Iowa 1963) (assignments of grain
warehouse receipts to plaintiff Commodity Credit Corp.); State Sec. Co.
v. Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co., 204 F. Supp. 207
(D. Neb. 1960), affd per curiam, 308 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1962) (mortgagee
as assignee pro tanto of fire insurance policy of mortgagor who apparently was in jail for arson); Campbell Soup Co. v. Diehm, 111 F. Supp. 211
(E.D. Pa. 1952) (plaintiff allowed to sue as principal or third party
beneficiary to gain advantage of equitable remedy); see Boris v. Moore,
152 F. Supp. 595, 602 (E.D. Wis. 1957), aff'd, 253 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1958).
In Kincaid v. City of Anchorage, decision on whether assignee was
an indispensable party was withheld until it was determined whether the
assignee would be joined. 15 FED. RULEs SERv. 19a.1, Case 5 (D. Alaska
1951). And in Automatic Dialing Corp. v. Maritime Quality Hardware,
98 F. Supp. 650 (D. Me. 1951), an objection was made to a counterclaim
on grounds it had been assigned to the R.F.C., and was overcome by
voluntary appearance of the R.F.C. The abstract rule that an assignor
is a real party in interest was held to exist only for the benefit of the
obligor-assignee could not demand assignor be brought in.
105. In Northwest Oil & Ref. Co. v. Honolulu Oil Corp., 195 F. Supp.
281 (D. Mont. 1961), the plaintiff originally had a contract to purchase
oil from the defendant and the right to build a terminal for this activity.
The plaintiff assigned the contract rights to another company and later
brought suit to establish the right to build the terminal. The court concluded that the plaintiff had assigned all rights, had not reserved this
one, accordingly was not the real party in interest, and dismissed the
suit.
106. Where plaintiff, owner of an offshore oil rig, had made a total
assignment of its contract with the defendant to a bank, the court held
that an assignor for security retained sufficient interest to be a real party
in interest. The court sensibly refused the defendant's motion to dismiss
and ordered, sua sponte, joinder of the bank, which apparently did not
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Of course, many cases do not fall easily into the transferortransferee dichotomy, but are simply multiple party transactions, in which event the courts usually uphold the sole plaintiff
as the real party, relying upon the phrase contained in 17(a)
which best fits the situation.1 07 The few cases resulting in dismissal rely on substantive law to conclude that plaintiff has
no legitimate claim to relief. 0 8

B. WHERE CREATION OR

DEFEAT OF

DIvERsiTY JURISDICTION Is AN

OBJECT IN THE SELECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF

1.

Insurer Subrogoror Insured Subrogee as Plaintiff

In some situations, the motivation for selecting a plaintiff to
shield an insurance company from the jury may be absent or
may coincide or conflict with the object of choosing a plaintiff
whose citizenship will create diversity jurisdiction. 10 9 In any
event, the defendant will object that the nonparty is the real
party in interest or that the choice is collusive under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1359. In either instance dismissal for lack of diversity may be
sought. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States'" stated that
the partial subrogee and partial subrogor were both real parties,
want to come in. Texas San Juan Oil Corp. v. An-Son Offshore Drilling
Co., 194 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Where after commencement of
the lawsuit, the plaintiff assigned the claim, Rule 17(a) could not be
used to dismiss the claim, but rather Rule 25 would govern the court's
discretion in substituting the new parties. Unison Realty Co. v. RKO
Theatres, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
107. Where the defendant insurance company had issued a blanket
fidelity bond against theft by employees to multiple members of a cotton
exchange which provided that all actions on the bond should be by "the
first named assured," the plaintiff, a member of the exchange, was permitted to sue alone even though it was not the first named. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. W. D. Felder & Co., 214 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir. 1954).
Also, the holder of a patent license can sue as a "real party in interest"
without joining all the equitable beneficiaries. He is an "agent for
collection" or the "maker of a contract" and the beneficiaries are not
indispensable parties. Imperial Appliance Corp. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co.,
239 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Wis. 1965). Finally, a mother was allowed to
sue on behalf of herself and as guardian or trustee for her daughter on
notes inherited from their husband-father under French law arid thus
avoid statute of limitations arguments potentially applicable to the
daughter but not to the mother. Chuchuru v. Chutchurru, 185 F.2d 62
(10th Cir. 1950).
108. See Walton v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 192 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.
1951).
109. The same strategy and concept apply to the choices of the "real
party-defendant in interest." Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348
U.S. 48, 51 (1954). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1966).
110. 338 U.S. 366 (1949); see text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 675

that suit could be brought by both, that both were necessary,
but that neither was indispensable. Subsequent judicial applications thus have generally not forced joinder of a real party
whose presence would destroy diversity.11 '
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co." 2 shows a
manipulative application of these rules. After suit was commenced against the insured, National Cash Register, in state
court, the insurer, Allstate Insurance Company of Illinois, joined
with National Cash to sue as plaintiffs in federal court for a
declaratory judgment against Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance
Company, an Illinois corporation, seeking to establish coverage
of the accident. At this point, Lumbermen's moved to dismiss
because both plaintiff Allstate and defendant Lumbermen's were
The plaintiffs thereupon successfully
Illinois corporations.
moved to withdraw Allstate as a party plaintiff in order to cure
nondiversity. The court found that the declaratory action had
been instituted by Allstate attorneys with authorization and consultation from the National Cash attorneys, and that National
Cash was not a mere dummy but retained control of the suit.
Despite further findings that National Cash had been solicited
as plaintiff by Allstate, that Allstate had an interest and had
promised National Cash indemnity for costs and attorney fees,
the court decided National Cash had not been made a "party by
collusion" within section 1359. Apparently, if Allstate was a
real party in interest, it was only a necessary party, not compelled to join where jurisdiction wou2d be defeated.
111. Thus, a Wisconsin federal court concluded that, though a workmen's compensation subrogee was the real party under Michigan law,
it was only a "necessary" party under Rule 19, and need not be joined
where its presence would defeat diversity. Morelli v. Northwest Eng'r
Corp., 30 F.R.D. 522 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
While continuing to maintain that Aetna has to do only with the
Anti-Assignment and Tort Claims Acts and does not control results under loan settlements, the Fifth Circuit, in dictum, has given the subrogee
mere necessary party status where its joinder would defeat diversity.
Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp. v. Lawson, 271 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1959). In
Petrikin v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 15 F.R.D. 346 (W.D. Mo. 1954), although no facts were given, diversity was apparently in issue where the
subrogee by a valid "assignment for collection" to the plaintiff insured
removed itself from the status of real party in interest under Missouri
law. A Pennsylvania federal court held that where the insurance company was a total subrogee, it could maintain suit as sole plaintiff where
joinder of the insured would defeat diversity. Security Mut. Cas. Co.
v. Rich, 16 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Pa. 1954). But see McLouth Steel Corp. v.
Mesta Mach. Co., 116 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affd, 214 F.2d 608 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, Hartford Acc. & Indem Co. v. Foster, 348 U.S. 873
(1954).
112. 204 F. Supp. 83 (D. Conn. 1962).
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In contrast, Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Lohman"13 concluded
that the subrogor and subrogee were both indispensable, and dismissed for lack of diversity. The insured, an Illinois citizen,
never received service of process in an Illinois auto liability
suit, which resulted in an uncontested $18,500 judgment against
him. His insurance company, a Michigan corporation, paid him
$17,500 and brought suit alone in federal court under an Illinois
statute making the Illinois sheriff liable to the "party aggrieved."
The insured brought suit in state court against the sheriff. Finding that the Ilinois statute created a remedy in the insured only,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, relying upon United
States Supreme Court decisions holding that a "surety liable
for only part of a debt does not become subrogated to collateral
remedies available to the creditor unless he pays the whole
debt."'1 4 Any assertion of rights as partial subrogee, the court
held, would require joinder as a joint interest under Rule 19(a)
and thus defeat diversity. No mention, however, was made of
Aetna.
2.

Choice of Plaintiff Who Must Qualify Under State Court
Proceedings
a. Administrators: Wrongful Death Claims in Particular

Frequently an out-of-state citizen is chosen as administrator
for a local estate in order to create diversity. Since Rule 17(a)
provides that an administrator is a real party and the jurisdictional rule is that his citizenship controls, diversity will follow.
The defendant is forced to object that the niceties of state law
somehow do not recognize the administrator as a real party but
only as a nominal party, or that his appointment has been collusive. Neither objection has proved successful. The courts have
uniformly held that, since the administrator has total legal control of the suit, he is the real party, and, since the appointment
takes place in open state court proceedings, it cannot be called
collusive. Indeed, the typical George Washington admission of
the lawyer, both to the state judge and later to the federal judge,
that he seeks the appointment only to pick cherries from the
diversity tree most often brings escape from reprimand because
his truth hath made him free of collusion.
The pressure for this type of appointment apparently is
greatest in the Eastern Megalopolis. The study by the Univer113.

295 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1961).

114. Id. at 264.
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sity of Pennsylvania researchers concludes that twenty percent
of federal court wrongful death actions are infected with the
disease." 5 The Third Circuit, the object of the Pennsylvania
study, had recent occasion to restate its permissive view in Borror v. Sharon Steel Co." 6 Bonita Curtician, a Pennsylvania resident, was killed in an explosion in Pennsylvania. A West Virginia citizen was appointed administrator of her estate by the
Pennsylvania register of wills. As administrator, he brought a
single complaint under the Pennsylvania survival statute and the
wrongful death statute. The defendant exerted great energy to
show that the plaintiff "is not a real party in interest but at best
a kind of next friend or guardian ad litem, in short, a kind of
very nominal plaintiff."'1 7 Judge Biggs rejected this by tabulating the legal fiction factors that go into the making of a real party in interest: He is the master of the litigation, compelled to account for his conduct, removable only for good cause, may oppose
removal and must be given notice of removal; he holds the proceeds of the suit for the beneficiaries and authorizes settlement.
Judge Biggs also treated as irrelevant the defendant's argument
that the beneficiaries under certain conditions might be able to
sue on the wrongful death claim. The express words of Rule
17(a) allowing an administrator or person authorized by statute
to sue alone, it was held, demanded the result. Further, since
the defendant conceded that the plaintiff was the only person
who could, under any conditions, bring the survival action, the
administrator was the sole real party in interest on that claim.
Jurisdiction of the wrongful death action would follow under
the pendant jurisdiction doctrine of Hum v. Oursler."8 Finally,
Judge Biggs reiterated his position in Fallat v. Gouran"9 that
of "capacity" to sue and not one of
the question was really 2one
"real party-in-interest."' 0
121
met
The Second Circuit, in Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co.,
the same problem by affirming per curiam a district judge who

115. ALI, STUDY

OF TE DwIsioN OF JURIsDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND

FEDERAL COURTS, App. B, 166, 171 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1965).

See Cohan and Tate, Manufacturing Federal Diversity Jurisdiction by
the Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriety, 1 VILL.
L. REV. 201 (1956).
116. 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964); folowed in Curnow v. West View
Park Co., 337 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1964).
117. Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 1964).
118.

289 U.S. 238 (1933).

119. 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).
120. Id. at 329-30.
121. 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn.), aff'd per curiam, 324 F.2d 235 (2d
Cir. 1963).
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followed the Third Circuit position. Decedent had been domiciled in Connecticut. Decedent's mother, who had been appointed administrator by a Connecticut court, withdrew, and a
citizen of Pennsylvania was appointed solely to create diversity.1 22 The court refused to dismiss, agreed that the appointment was not collusive under section 1359 and that the express
words of Rule 17(a) authorized him to sue. Defendant argued
that a Connecticut statute, which provided that in suits by nonresident fiduciaries the "same court shall have jurisdiction as
would have if the plaintiff resided in the town where the court
of probate which granted the administration is held,"' 23 converted the plaintiff's residency (and apparently his citizenship)
from Pennsylvania to Connecticut. The court rejected this argument, calling the statute a "local venue statute." Since all
out-of-state fiduciaries, even those representing out-of-state estates, must qualify under Connecticut probate proceedings, to
construe the statute as a substantive limitation on the right of
a foreign fiduciary to sue would defeat diversity in any case in
and would unconstitutionwhich such a fiduciary was a party
1 24
ally exclude it from federal court.
The Eighth Circuit has also considered the question recently.
In County of Todd v. Loegering,1 25 it followed the lead of the
Third Circuit and held that the appointment of a Montanan as
a Minnesota wrongful death administrator to litigate a Minnesota-based accident was not collusive. The court reasoned that
under Minnesota statutes the administrator was the real party
in interest, despite claims by the defendant that recent changes
streamlining Minnesota probate practice had reduced his status
to a formal party.
In a district court case involving the Texas death statute
which provided that the action could be brought by surviving
122. 217 F. Supp. at 875.
STAT. ANN. § 52-21 (1958).
123. CoNN. GEN_.
124. This argument may be questionable today since the states probably can constitutionally require a resident administrator to be appointed. See text accompanying note 190 infra. However, this same
type of argument was used by Judge Murrah in sustaining diversity
jurisdiction in a suit by a Californian who was appointed administrator
by an Oklahoma court and who brought suit to cancel deeds to Oklahoma realty. Oklahoma statutes limiting actions to the "same courts"
in which they "might have been maintained" by the intestate, and limiting actions for the recovery of real estate to the "county in which the
subject of the action is situated" were held not intended to close the door
to a federal diversity suit. Erwin v. Barrow, 217 F.2d 522 (10th Cir.
1954).
125. 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961).
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spouse, parents, children or "by either of them for the benefit of
all," the Mexican widow was allowed to sue alone; her citizenship alone determined diversity, despite the fact that the recovery would also go to Texas children. 12 6 The words of Rule 17(a)
were held to require the result.
The main variations on this theme are cases resulting in defeat of diversity jurisdiction by withdrawal of the initial plaintiff and the appointment of an administrator whose citizenship
defeats diversity.127 Although the majority of recent cases involve wrongful death claims, the same device has been used in a
suit by a general administrator to cancel real estate deeds128 and
administrator with will anin a suit by a successor ancillary
29
nexed to recover oil royalties.'
b.

Guardians of Minors or Incompetents

Recent cases have not distinguished between a wrongful
death administrator and guardians of minors or incompetents.
In Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co.,1'3 for example, a seventeenyear-old was injured by a rifle. He and all defendants were
citizens of Connecticut. His paternal grandmother, a citizen of
Florida, was appointed guardian of his estate by the Connecticut probate court, notwithstanding the admission of counsel
before the probate judge that the purpose of the appointment
was to obtain diversity. In federal court, Judge Timbers, upholding diversity, held the factual and legal differences between this
situation and wrongful death actions irrelevant under the broad
command of Rule 17 (a).
126. Rodriguez v. Wheeler, 16 F.R.D. 103 (S.D. Tex. 1954); followed
in Rivera v. Chapa, 233 F. Supp. 428 (S.D. Tex. 1964) (Texas adult sons
disclaimed interest in New Mexico widow's action); cf. Du Roure v.
Alvord, 120 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (French heir could sue without
New York administrator, preserving diversity but not venue). Contra,
Campbell v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 148 F. Supp. 209 (D. Idaho 1957),
in which the Idaho Wrongful Death Act providing the decedent's "heirs
or personal representatives may maintain an action" was held to require
presence of a son as an indispensable party, thereby destroying diversity.
127. Grady v. Irvine, 254 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1958) (where Maryland
plaintiff died during suit, substitution of Virginia administrator destroyed diversity); cf. Simmons v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 235 F. Supp.
325 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
128. Erwin v. Barrow, 217 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1954).
129. Falsetti v. Indiana Oil Purchasing Co., 215 F. Supp. 420 (N.D.
Tex. 1963).
131. 217 F. Supp. 880 (D. Conn.), aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 238 (2d
Cir. 1963); Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn.),
affd per curiam, 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963).
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The Second Circuit affirmed Judge Timbers, following the
result worked out by Judge Biggs in Fallatv. Gouran,13 2 a case
in which Dixon, a Pennsylvania resident, became weak-minded
as a result of an auto accident. His daughter, a New Jersey
citizen, was appointed his general guardian by a Pennsylvania
court. The district judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that Dixon, the incompetent, was the real
party in interest and his citizenship controlled diversity. On
appeal, Judge Biggs, in a long analysis of the Supreme Court
decisions, asserted his unique approach that the real party in
interest rule was irrelevant, the question being solely one of
capacity to sue under 17 (b) and 17 (c).133
However, the Eighth Circuit has reached a contrary result.
In Martineau v. City of St. Paul,134 the attorneys for an injured
Minnesota child had Martineau, an Illinois attorney, appointed
general guardian by a Minnesota probate court. The Eighth
Circuit, after dissecting the provisions of Minnesota statutes,
concluded that the Illinois "guardian was a mere nominal party,"
and the boy was the real party in interest whose citizenship
controlled. 135
One variation can occur where the ward attempts suit without his guardian.

In Hart v. Feely,136 the incompetent was a

Pennsylvanian who, while competent, had issued a power of attorney to the New York plaintiff and the Pennsylvania defendant. Subsequent to the creation of the power of attorney a general guardian was appointed by a Pennsylvania court. Without
mentioning the real party in interest, the court found that the
court appointment of a guardian revoked the original power of
attorney and, in any event, the guardian was now an indispensable party. The case was dismissed for lack of diversity.
Since there are different categories of guardianship available
under state law, and if it is important to the attorneys that the
132. 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).
133. The same rule was applied to the general guardian of a minor
after the court allowed correction of the jurisdictional defect by the reappointment of the original guardian ad litem as the general guardian.
Berkowitz v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 217 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Pa.
1962), affd per curiam, 317 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1963); see Morris v. Bradley, 139 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (mistakenly allowing citizenship
of guardian ad litem to control).
134. 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).
135. Recall that this circuit subsequently refused to pierce the citizenship of the wrongful death administrator under Minnesota statutes
in County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961). The court
nonetheless insisted it was being consistent with Martineau.
136. 109 F. Supp. 3 (M.D. Pa. 1953).
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citizenship of the ward control, they may have appointed merely
a "guardian ad litem." In such cases the ward remains the
real party whose citizenship and residence control diversity and
137
venue determinations.
c.

Qualified Out-of-State Fiduciaries Failing To Qualify Locally

A different situation exists where an out-of-state fiduciary
who has been appointed by an out-of-state court sues in federal
court. As noted in Van Dusen v. Barrack138 the vast majority of
American jurisdictions allow suits by foreign fiduciaries, but require them to qualify or to perform some preliminary act to
maintain suit. 39 The objections made by the defendant are thus
usually made to the capacity of the plaintiff under Rule 17 (b)
and the forum law. The defendant's further objections that the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest are reducible to assertions that either an existing local fiduciary should be the plaintiff or that local qualifications must be undertaken which might
include the appointment of a resident fiduciary whose citizenship
would destroy diversity. The plaintiff may resist local qualification in order to retain diversity, with the defendant urging the
necessity of local qualifications to eliminate it.
In Elliott v. Day,'40 two citizens of Alaska died in attempting
to rescue the Oregon defendant from Mount Everest. The Alaska-appointed administrators brought suit in the Oregon federal
court making complaint under the Alaska Wrongful Death Act.
The defendant pointed to Oregon stalutes disqualifying nonresidents from acting in a representative capacity and argued that
the Alaska administrators had no capacity to sue. If the remedy
to this objection was that local fiduciaries must be appointed, it
would destroy diversity. The court blocked this move, however,
by holding that, as a matter of comity, the Oregon statute did
not apply to preclude suits by out-of-state fiduciaries when there
were neither estate nor creditors in Oregon and the proceeds of
the suit would go to named nonresident beneficiaries. It therefore allowed the'suit as brought.
137. Horzepa v. Dauski, 40 F. Supp. 4'76 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); see Blackwell v. Vance Trucking Co., 139 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.S.C. 1956) (unsuccessful attempt to use guardian ad litem's residence for venue purposes);
cases cited note 133 supra.
138. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
139. Id. at 623-24.
140. 218 F. Supp. 90 (D.Ore. 1962).
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The court further theorized 14 1 that the wrongful death administrator is merely a "nominal" party and the Alaskan widow
and children are the real parties in interest. The court was
perhaps referring to real parties in an economic sense. However, the Eighth Circuit, upholding a somewhat similar action in
McCoy v. Blakely,142 categorized the administrator, rather than
the surviving parents, as the real party in interest and therefore
sustained an action by the Iowa administrator in the Nebraska
federal court under the Nebraska wrongful death statute for the
ultimate benefit of the Nebraska parents. Against arguments
that the Nebraska statutory scheme would be defeated, the court
presumed that the Iowa administrator would distribute according
to the Nebraska statute.
In Patterson v. Wynkoop,143 the out-of-state executor was
forced to join the local administrator of an estate as an indispensable real party in interest defendant, thus defeating diversity. This result was also supported by a claim to lack of federal
probate jurisdiction.
It is not necessary for courts, however, to inject Rule 17 (a)
into these situations. They can be decided solely on the basis
1 44
of Rule 17(b) capacity. For example, Jones v. Goodman concluded without mention of the real party rule that a suit by an
Iowa administrator in a Kansas federal court under the Kansas
wrongful death statute could not be brought as framed by the
plaintiff. Apparently suit could be brought only by a Kansas
45
administrator, in which event there would be no diversity.
3. Transfer of Claims
a. Transferee as Plaintiff
As discussed previously, 146 assignees are "real parties in in141. Id. at 93-94, citing Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488, 493 (9th Cir.
1949). The many cases cited in Elliot v. Day treat the issue as a capacity
problem.
142. 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954).
143. 329 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1964). But see Du Roure v. Alvord, 120
F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (allowing suit by French heir without
joinder of New York administrator); Redditt v. Hale, 184 F.2d 443 (8th
Cir. 1950) (guardian-administrator could sue on claims not within exclusive probate jurisdiction).
144. 114 F. Supp. 110 (D. Kan. 1953).
145. The court later said this case does "not stand for the proposition that a foreign fiduciary cannot sue in Kansas, but rather that there
must be assets of the estate or a valid cause of action in existence in
Kansas before such fiduciary may maintain a suit." McElroy v. Security Nat'l Bank, 215 F. Supp. 775, 778 (D. Kan. 1963).
146. See notes 98-104 supra and accompanying text.
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terest under the substantive law of most states." Thus it becomes a tempting device for the lawyer to create diversity by
transferring the claim to a person of diverse citizenship. 147 The
defendant may attempt to prove the transfer invalid or incomplete under state law, assert that the transferor is indispensable,
and assert the transaction to be a sham or collusive in terms of a
state policy against maintenance or under the federal policy of
section 1359. Usually the real party in interest rule is also invoked. The judicial response is similar to those where diversity
is not in issue: So long as the lawyer is careful in following the
legal form of transferring complete legal control over the claim,
the additional factor that creation of diversity motivated the
transfer generally is treated as irrelevant. Thus the "improper
or collusive" description of section 1359 is given no additional
federal meaning. Once the court decides the transfer is valid
under state law, then it somehow cannot be "collusive" within
section 1359. These general observations, however, must be taken
with the caveat that in those cases where diversity is at stake
and section 1359 is invoked, the transfer of control will be subjected to much closer scrutiny than when the object of the
transfer is not diversity. In such a case the real facts as to finance, control, and benefit may influence the judge toward a
finding of invalidity under state law.
(1)

With Object To Defeat Diversity

Assignment has been successfully used to prevent diversity
in suits on life insurance policies, both when the assignment was
made before initiation of the lawsuit 4s and after removal. 149 It
has been stated that even if the assignment was sham or collusive, section 1359 provides no objection because there appears to
be no clear federal policy against the defeat of diversity jurisdiction. 50
147. A device that can be related to assignment is the filing of a disclaimer of interest by one originally considered indispensable in order
to save diversity. Amnot., 31 A.L.R.2d 910 (1953).
148. Krenzien v. United Servs. Life Ins. Co., 121 F. Supp. 243 (D.
Kan. 1954).
149. Leshem v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.
N.Y.1963).
150. Ibid. The absence of a federal policy against defeat of diversity
jurisdiction did not deter the pro tern judge in Lisenby v. Patz, 130 F.
Supp. 670 (E.D.S.C. 1955). There the plaintiff, in advance of initiating
his suit in state court, had assigned an undivided 1/100 interest in his
personal injury claim to the Georgia brother-in-law of his counsel. The
federal court noted that the conceded purpose of this assignment was to
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With Object To Create Diversity

Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and
Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co.151 brought notoriety to the device of reincorporation in another state to gain access to the federal court and consequently a change of law. Perhaps because
of the death of Tyson and rise of Erie, the wholesale abuses of
this device are rarely observed in the recent cases. 15 2 Only one
recent case indicates anything approaching reincorporation and
total transfer of assets to create diversity, and the result there
was inconclusive. 5 3 More often, disputes center around simple
transfers of claims between existing sister corporations or between a corporation and its principal shareholder. Bradbury v.
Dennis'5 4 is typical and presents a recent survey of the area.
The court's reasoning represents a common sense approach to
diversity jurisdiction:
Certainly diversity jurisdiction should not be made to depend
on whether someone can pick a legal flaw in the transaction by

which jurisdiction is conferred. It should not be made to depend upon or await adjudication of the legality of the transac-

tion under state law. All this means that the state of the law
is left in the grey zone where we found it. Certainly no rule of
thumb is suggested or stated. But, after all, it is the words of a
prevent removal by the Georgia defendant and pursued an extremely
technical analysis of South Carolina law to conclude that it prohibited

the assignment of personal injury claims prior to judgment.

The court

finally called the transaction "collusive" under South Carolina law, basing the invalidity of the assignment on public policy, and refused to remand. This result appears atypical; generally diversity has been successfully defeated through assignments. See Field, Proposalson Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction,17 S.C.L. Rsv. 669, 671 (1965); Comment, 17 S.C.L.
Rav. 790 (1965).

151. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
152. See Frank, For MaintainingDiversity Jurisdiction,73 YALE L.J.
7, 10 (1963).
153. Tower Realty Co. v. City of East Detroit, 185 F.2d 590 (6th Cir.
1950). Even though the plaintiff conceded the transfer of the assets of
a Michigan corporation to a Delaware corporation was for the sole purpose of creating diversity, the trial court upheld the bona fide nature of

the transaction and sustained diversity; the appellate court reversed for
further examination of the transaction on the facts.
154. 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
A Colorado partnership contracted to purchase Colorado realty from the
Colorado defendant. The partnership assigned all assets to the newly
formed Colorado corporation. Bradbury, who was not a resident of
Colorado, eventually became sole shareholder and the corporation became insolvent. To create diversity the claim was assigned to Bradbury.
The defendant objected to jurisdiction and the court responded that
though it was clear Bradbury was not the real party in interest as sole
shareholder before the assignment, he was now. Section 1359 was no
objection to an assignment valid under state law.
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federal statute we construe in the context of an historical purpose to deny diversity jurisdiction when it would operate to
serve a purpose which is unsuited to the good order of federal
court administration. 55
There are cases, however, where, as part of his obligation to show
federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff had the burden of proving the
validity of the transfer at a preliminary hearing.156
When real estate is involved a quit claim deed may be employed to effectuate the transfer. It has been seen that even
where federal diversity is not in issue, the court may strike down
a "sham" transaction as a "simulation for the convenience of parties" by going to the facts and dismissing because the plaintiff
is not the real party in interest. 157 But even when section 1359
is involved, a quit claim deed may be given effect if valid under
state law, notwithstanding that the admitted purpose is to create
diversity. 58
Similar maneuvering seems present in Cobb v. National
Lead Co., 59 where choice of venue was made by an assignment
of an oil lease claim by the father who was a resident of the
Western District to the plaintiff son who was a resident of the
Eastern District of Arkansas. The defendant's objection that the
father was indispensable was oddly met with an answer that the
son, as assignee, was now the real party in interest under Rule
155. Id. at 76. See generally Dunham v. Robertson, 198 F.2d 316
(10th Cir. 1952) (assignment to trustee in bankruptcy); Rosenberg v.
Platt, 229 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Wis. 1964) (assignment of negotiable note);
Paper Makers Importing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 165 F. Supp. 491
(E.D. Wis. 1958) (buyer's assignment to seller who brought action).
156. See Hartmann Coal Mining Co. v. Hoke, 157 F. Supp. 313 (E.D.
Pa. 1957), which involved the assignment of an arbitration award from
a Pennsylvania corporation to a New Jersey corporation, both owned by
the same people. Plaintiff would have to show assignment relinquished
all rights in the award and was not made for the sole purpose of bringing
the action in the federal court, relying on Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp.
791 (D.P.R. 1951), which placed a burden of proof on plaintiff president
to show assignment from his corporation was bona fide.
157. Archie v. Shell Oil Co., 110 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1953).
158. In City of Eufaula v. Pappas, 213 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Ala. 1963),
three days before state condemnation proceedings were instituted, the
Alabama owners of property made quitclaim deeds for $1 to a New Jersey relative who agreed to divide the award among the grantors. The
New Jersey defendant was successful in removing the subsequent state
action to the federal court. The court flatly rejected the contention of
the plaintiff based on section 1359, holding motive irrelevant so long as
the transaction is valid under state law. Reformers call this a "particular egregious example." ALI, STuDy OF Tm,DIvisioN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTs, 101 n.40 (Proposed Final Draft No.

1, 1965).
159.

215 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Ark. 1963).
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17. The court did not mention Rule 19. Apparently section 1359
was considered irrelevant because it deals only with jurisdiction
and not venue. 60
An additional problem is presented by those cases in which
separate caims have been aggregated to sustain the jurisdictional amount.16 ' One court drew a fine distinction by allowing
an "assignee for collection" to sue on bearer bonds as the real
party in interest on assignments valued over $3,000, but dismissed the part of his claim based on assignments under $3,000
on the theory that section 1359 did not allow aggregation of
6 2
claims by this device.
b. Transferor or Other Party to Multiple-Party Transaction
as Plaintiff
Creation or defeat of diversity, as well as other motivations
already discussed,16 3 may lead the lawyer to choose a "transferor"
or other person connected with the transaction as plaintiff.
Again, despite claims that the control, financing, and benefits of
the litigation in fact are attributable to a nonparty, the objection that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest or that
the arrangement is collusive under section 1359 usually fails.

64

In stockholder derivative suits based on diversity jurisdiction, where the stockholder's corporation has the same citizenship as the defendant, diversity has been successfully created
160. Accord, Commerce Mfg. Co. v. Blue Jeans Corp., 146 F. Supp. 15
(E.D.N.C. 1956) (counterclaim on assignment from corporate officer; §
1359 irrelevant, but assignment genuine regardless of motive).
161. See, e.g., Hamon v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prods.
Corp., 227 F. Supp. 9 (D.Ore, 1964); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tel-Mor
Garage Corp., 92 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); cf. Continental Bus Sys.,
Inc. v. Rohwer, 172 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1959) (partial subrogee's claim
below jurisdictional amount).
162. Birkins v. Seaboard Serv., 96 F. Supp. 245 (D.N.J. 1950).
163. See text accompanying notes 105-08 supra.
164. In Bradley v. St. Louis Terminal Warehouse Co., 189 F.2d 818
(8th Cir. 1951), a field warehouseman. could sue to recover its security
interest without joinder of bankrupt bailor, relying on the principle
that a bailee in possession may sue for conversion of the goods as real
party in interest without joinder of the bailor. Valentine v. Powers, 85
F. Supp. 732 (D.Neb. 1948), held a promoter could sue in his own name
without joinder of his corporation. In J. W. Terteling & Sons v. Central
Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 8 F.R.D. 210 (D.Neb. 1948), subcontractors with the same citizenship as defendant owner were allowed
to finance diversity suit in name of prime contractor. See Matthies v.
Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 83-84 (D.Conn. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 270 F.2d 365, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1960). Contra, U.S.
Epperson Underwriting Co. v. Jessup, 22 F.R.D. 336 (M.D. Ga. 1958);
Photometric Prods. Corp. v. Radtke, 17 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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by making the corporation a defendant. Arguments by the real
defendant that the stockholder's corporation should be realigned
as a real party plaintiff have been overcome by a transparent
exception consisting of an allegation in the stockholder's complaint that the corporation is under "control antagonistic" to its
own interests. The court will then accept jurisdiction and pursue
the merits of the case, part of which will determine whether the
control is in fact antagonistic. 165 A similar strain on the language of Rule 17 (a) is presented where it is employed to sustain
diversity in suits related to oil leases involving multistate par60

ties.

IV.
A.

EVALUATION OF COURT RESPONSES

INSURANCE SUBROGATION

In the recent insurance subrogation cases the primary confict between the parties is whether the insurer will be exposed
to the jury. Although the issue is illusively framed in terms of
real party and joinder or nonjoinder, the rules of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, and privity are sufficient to prevent any real
threat of a second suit by the subrogated insurer who is not
made a party. 167 Less frequently real party objections are made
to obtain outright dismissal or to reduce the amount of damages.
Special situations arise where the strategic positions of the parties are reversed, as where there is a dispute as to the coverage
of the insurance. Complicating these problems, diversity factors
may create a struggle over jurisdictional dismissal.
The federal courts reach varied results generally rationalized
in terms of the technical legal doctrines which have arisen under
the real party rule. Few of these decisions clarify the objectives
of the parties or define what practically is at stake. Of those
that do mention jury strategy, some summarily reject as improper
the motive of the defendant to force the insurer before the
jury.168 Others impugn the integrity of the insurance com165. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957). It is interesting to speculate on the effect of a state statute requiring a derivative action to be
brought by the corporation as plaintiff. See Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp.
105 (W.D. Ky. 1951) (dismissing).
166. Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1963). The court's
excursion into Rule 17(a) was probably unnecessary, since it had already found that absent defendants were not indispensable, thus disposing of the attack on diversity jurisdiction.
167. See Capo v. C-O Two Fire Equip. Co., 93 F. Supp. 4 (D.N.J.

1950).
168.

Celanese Corp. of America v. John Clark Indus., Inc., 214 F.2d

551 (5th Cir. 1954).
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panies in using sham loan receipt settlement procedures to
avoid exposure to the jury. 6 9 Further, few decisions go beyond
a mechanical definition of what is included in the state substantive right and what is controlled by federal procedure. For example, the former real party provision of the New York Civil
Practice Act allowing subrogated insurers using loan receipts to
stay out of actions is supposedy procedural, 1'7 0 while similar
provisions in workmen's compensation statutes have been con71
strued as part of the substantive right under state law.'
Finally, except in cases of total subrogation, the general reaction
is to treat the absent party as merely necessary when diversity
jurisdiction is at stake, even though the result might have been
2
different if no diversity jurisdiction were involvedY.'
rt is submitted that the federal judge ought to strike to the
heart of the problem. Regardless of his decision as to joinder,
he ought to inform the jury fully as to any subrogation interests
in the plaintiff's claim. 7 3 This approach is premised on the belief that frank disclosure to the jury of the real interests involved is the only way to elicit good verdicts. 7 4 This full disclosure to the jury could be reconciled with Erie R.R. v. Tompkins as being part of the independent and uniform federal pro1 5
cedural policy of the seventh amendment.
Full disclosure to the jury may be taking place in the cases
169. See Condor Inv. Co. v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 211 F.
Supp. 671 (D. Ore. 1962).
170. Northboro Apartments, Inc. v. Wheatland Tube Co., 198 F. Supp.
245 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 135

F. Supp. 465, 469 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
171. E.g., Race v. Hay, 28 F.R.D. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
172. E.g., Morelli v. Northwest Eng'r Corp., 30 F.R.D. 522 (E.D. Wis.
1962).
173. Justice, then Judge, Whittaker reached this solution by concluding that even though the plaintiff as real party could sue alone,
since he was the "trustee of an express trust," the jury should be informed as to the beneficiary of the trust, namely the subrogated workmen's compensation carrier. Jenkins v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 18 F.R.D.
267 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
174. This preference is further supported by the trend in the tort
field to absolute liability, risk allocation, comprehensive insurance coverage, direct actions against insurers, disclosure of defendant insurers,
and corresponding changes in the mentality of the modern jury. See
Hughey v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 32 F.R.D. 340 (D. Del. 1963); Broeder,
The Pro and Con of Interjecting Plaintiff Insurance Companies in Jury
Trial Cases: An Isolated Jury Project Case Study, 6 NATURAL RESOURCES
J. 269 (1966).
175. Byrd v. Blue Ridge -Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958);
see Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights; To a More
Perfect Union, 40 TExAs L. REv. 211, 220 (1961); cf. Kiernan v. Van
Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965).
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in federal court which require joinder of the insurer.176 In the
cases where joinder is not required because it would destroy
diversity, the suggested practice would eliminate potential windfalls to the nonparty insurer caused by nondisclosure of the interest of the insurer. The approach would give rise to some forum shopping to the extent that state practice would not inform
the jury of the insurer's interest, whereas the federal practice
would. However, the plaintiff would not be tempted to forum
shop in the federal court since it would presumably not be to his
advantage, and the rule could be rationalized as one of the prices
a plaintiff must pay for litigating in federal court. On the other
hand, some unfair discrimination might be posited in removal
cases since the defendant could force disclosure of the insurance company by removal to the federal court.
If a policy of disclosure is followed, the problem is reduced
to one of joinder under Rule 19 where diversity is at stake. By
treating the subrogee as a merely necessary party, the federal
judge can retain jurisdiction, disclose its interests to the jury,
and, after verdict, attempt to bar double liability and litigation
by appropriate orders of notice and joinder in the judgment.
Finally, it is submitted that even if the federal courts do not
adopt the above approach, at least their future decisions should
explicitly explore the practice under state law17 7 as to disclosure
of the insurer's interest regardless of joinder, rather than pursue
endless state-federal precedents defining the real party in interest.
B. REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS
The primary objective of questioning the status of the representative in wrongful death and guardian suits when diversity
is not at issue is to obtain dismissal on the ground that the
176. On the other hand, the federal judge may require joinder but
order a separate trial or not inform the jury that the insurer is a party
and will participate in the judgment. See interview with Judge Ford
of the Eastern District of Kentucky, Note, Civil Procedure: Insurance
Companies as Real Parties in Interest, 46 Ky. L.J. 252, 259 n.25 (1958).
Contrary to Judge Ford's practice, a proper reading of the following
language in Aetna might require jury disclosure in all events : "The
pleadings should be made to reveal and assert the actual interest of the
plaintiff, and to indicate the interest of any others in the claim." 338
U.S. at 382. See Wright v. Schebler Co., 37 F.R.D. 319 (S.D. Iowa 1965);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 166 F. Supp.
11 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
177. For a good analysis see Maryland v. Baltimore Transit Co., 37
F.R.D. 34 (D. Md. 1965).
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representative lacks authority to bring the suit under the state
statutes. The federal decisions overwhelmingly recognize the
representative as the real party and thus have properly eliminated Rule 17(a) as any real barrier, though the defendants,
with the court's indulgence, often like to skirmish with it. The
real problem left, then, is Rule 17(b) capacity under state law,
which, if it requires local representatives, may turn into a "doorclosing" problem in the federal court.
It is submitted that the federal decisions which treat Rule
17(a) as substantially irrelevant and look to Rule 17(b) represent the better approach.
In the many cases where the representative is hand-picked
to create or destroy diversity, Rule 17(a) generally protects this
choice, since section 1359 on collusive creation of diversity is
treated as a nullity generally, and especially in this area. At
this stage it seems best for judges to treat section 1359 as dormant, since at the very least there is now certainty as to what
the courts will do. To interpret life back into it would lead to
much confusion. The appropriate solution here is new legislation
of the sort proposed by the American Law Institute, which
would specifically fix the citizenship of the decedent or ward as
controlling diversity.' 78 This solution would have certainty and
would remove many of the manipulation strains from Rule 17 (a).
C. TRNSFERS OF INTERESTS
Where diversity is not at stake, the majority of federal court
decisions give full effect to the historical purpose of the real
party in interest rule-removal of real or imagined procedural
barriers restricting the transferability of interests. Only when
some remaining restrictive state policy can be found, such as that
against maintenance or the assignability of personal injury tort
79
claims, does the federal court consider dismissal appropriate.
It is submitted that the same results can be reached by analysis
in terms of failure-to-state-a-claim without reliance on Rule
17 (a), and that, in effect, the federal courts already have adopted
this approach.
Where creation of diversity is an object of the transfer, federal courts are not inclined to call it "collusive" so long as state
178.

Discussed in text accompanying note 187 infra.

179.

E.g., Tabben v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Ky.

1966), where it is stated in dictum that even if claims for wrongful refusal to settle were assignable under state law,* assignor's bankruptcy
would preclude valid assignment.
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law would-uphold the transfer. Section 1359 is pretty much a
dead letter here, as in the case of hand-picking personal representatives. If new legislation is not adopted, it is submitted
that federal courts should breathe new life into section 1359 as
-applied to transfers to create diversity. ft is apparent that the
,original purpose of section 1359 was primarily directed toward
'such transfers.
As for the defeat of diversity, it appears that legislation is
necessary to overcome the lack of power implicit in the notion
that there is no federal policy against defeat of diversity. Even
without legislation, federal courts should be less shy about using
their injunctive powers in aid of their jurisdiction to prevent
subsequent transfers of interests which take the suit to state
court. 80° Such a trend woud be consistent with the legislative
history of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 which supposedly overturned the
Toucey decision.'"'

D. MuLTIPLE PARTY TRANSACTIONS
From the broad spectrum of substantive law giving rise to
multiple party relations, a great variety of motivations are found
in the selection of a single plaintiff and the objection of the defendant to that selection. The most typical reaction of the courts
here is to view Rule 17(a) as a highly technical objection and to
treat both the plaintiff and the nonparty as real parties who
may maintain the action either alone or together. This is especially so where the court senses an otherwise meritorious claim.
The problems are thus converted into Rule 19 joinder and Rule
17(b) capacity issues, and are given their only significant analysis under these concepts. Some courts, however, read Rule
17(a). literally and decide a wide variety of issues only in terms
,of its express words. The reader is left to wonder whether the
result would be affected if these judges gave Rule 17(a) a nonexclusive de minimis reading as do the majority of other judges.
VI.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN-THE LAW

Professor Atkinson in 1957 made a successful plea for the
abolition of the New York real party in interest rule, criticizing
it as- a useless, confusing appendage whose function is better
180. See Leshem v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 504
_(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
181. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S.
511, 521 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
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performed by other rules.1 2 His research, however, was directed at the New York real party rule and did not undertake to
say what would happen if Rule 17 (a) were similarly eliminated
from the Federal Rules. Although the recent amendment to
Rule 17(a) attempts some minor clarification, there appears to be
no recent major reevaluation of Federal Rule 17 (a) or proposals
to change it. On the other hand, since real party objections are
often linked to joinder and jurisdictional concepts, the recently
accomplished overhaul of Rule 19 and the federal jurisdiction
changes proposed by the American Law Institute, taken separately or together, will undercut 17 (a) doctrine to a great extent. 183
What they will do to the results is another question.
s4
Analysis of the proposed ALI amendments to 28 U.S.C.1
must begin with an examination of the trend toward restriction
of diversity jurisdiction shown in recent amendments to Title 28.
The amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), effective August 14, 1964,
provides that an insurer, sued under a direct action statute,
shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a
citizen, as well as of any State by which the insurer has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business.185
This amendment directly reverses Lumbermen's Mut.Cas. Co. v.
Elbert,i8 6 where the Supreme Court termed the insurer the "real
party in interest defendant" and employed the insurer's citizenship alone as the test for diversity. The amendment, however, reverses the Lumbermen's rule only as to defendant insurers and clearly does not affect the choice of the plaintiff in insurance subrogation situations. However, the statute may mark
182. Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Plea for Its Abolition, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 926 (1957). His suggestion was honored posthumously by § 1004 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
which became effective in 1963.
183. E.g., Professor Reed would apparently dismiss a federal diversity action where joinder of a necessary party would defeat diversity
and a state forum is available in which he can be joined. Reed," Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MiCH. L. REV. 327, 523-27
(1957). See also HAZARD & LOUISELL, CASES ON.PLEADING & PROCEDURE
700 (1962).
184. ALI, STUDY OF =a DivisioN OF JumsDicTioN BETWEEx STATE
AND FEDERAL CouRTs, (Tent. Draft No. 3 April 15, 1965); id. (Proposed

Final Draft No. 1 April 19, 1965).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1965).
186. 348 U.S. 48 (1948). The amendment has been criticized as an
overreaction to the peculiar problems in the Louisiana federal courts
and as an unwise restriction of diversity in Wisconsin, the other state
with a full-fledged direct action statute. Weckstein, The 1964 Diversity
Amendment: Congressional Indirect Action Against State "Direct 'Action" Laws, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 268.
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-thebeginning of a legislative trend which will eventually result
in the application of the same rules and policy to plaintiffs.
Under section 1301(b) (4) of the ALI's proposed revision of
diversity and federal question jurisdiction, the citizenship of the
decedent or the ward would control diversity is7
Proposed section 1307(b) is the other section primarily dealing with situations under 17(a). It would retain the present
substance of section 1359 but would add:
(b) Whenever an object of a sale, assignment, or other
transfer of the whole or any part of any interest in a claim or
any other property has been to enable or to prevent the mvoking of federal jurisdiction under this chapter or chapter 158 of
this title, jurisdiction of a civil action shall be determined as if
such sale, assignment or other transfer had not occurred. The
word "transfer" -as used in this section includes the appointment of a trustee, receiver, or other fiduciary, or of any other
person to hold or receive interests of any kind, whether made
by private persons or by a court or any other official body.88

These two proposals probably would reverse that line of
cases, sustaining diversity, which refused to impute collusiveness, under the present section 1359, to appointments and transfers valid under state law On the other hand, the two sections,
by ignoring appointments. or transfers made to defeat diversity,
-would create diversity where past decisions denied it. No one
should quarrel with this limited objective of frustrating the
manipulation of citizenship to create or defeat diversity
A question that should be raised is whether proposed section
1301(b) (4) eliminates more diversity than it ought. For exampIe, where the decedent's beneficiaries are all out-of-state citizens
and in fact are prosecuting the action, should diversity be denied
in a wrongful death action merely because the decedent was a
.citizen of the forum jurisdiction? The same question may be
raised in cases in which the executor or administrator is an outof-state relative in non-wrongful death actions brought by or
gainst the estate. The provisions of the section as applied to
.minors and incompetents would have the least objection, since
-the ward's interest is the one most directly at stake.
Another -question that may be raised, is whether federal leg:islation is-the appropriate -remedy to correct the abuses perceived in selection of nonresident fiduciaries. The new provision
is supported by the study of diversity creation in Philadelphia.'"f
187. ALI, STuDY

or Tm DivisioN or JuRISDIcTIoIf BETwEEN STATi
COURS 9 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 April 19, 1965).
Id. at,23.

,ANDFEDERAL

-

188.

189. Id. at 62, 175.

1967]

REAL PARTY RULE

It appears clear, however, that the states may constitutionally
"close the door" to the federal courts in such actions by requiring appointment of a resident fiduciary.100 If part of the reform
thesis is that collusive extension of diversity jurisdiction is an
invasion of state judicial power, the states, as the most interested
parties, perhaps should be the ones to remedy it on an individual'
basis.
Apart from representative suits treated in section 1301(b)
(4), the proposed section 1307(b) completes a total coverage of
the remaining cases where Rule 17 (a) can be manipulated. Section 1307(b) seems to be a fair compromise between the repealed
assignee clause, which arbitrarily looked through many bona
fide transfers, and current section 1359, which catches manipulation like a sieve. In compromise, however, the new section sets
up a difficult factual inquiry into the "objects" of any transaction which creates or defeats diversity.' 91 Although this test appears simple enough, it may be difficult to administer. Innocent claims to diversity jurisdiction may be plagued by arguments directed to this provision based solely on the fact that the
chain of title is traceable to a nondiverse citizen.
The word "transfer" appearing in the proposal will also
create fruitful ground for argument. Limitations on imagina-,
tion are probably the only boundaries here; witness the simple
word "transfer" in defining preferences under section 60(a) of
the Bankruptcy Act. Old learning and results under the assignee
clause will be resurrected, such as the distinctions between ordinary assignments and assignments by operation of law. To the
extent that "transfer" is broader than "assignments," the new
section would open to challenge types of transactions. not vulnerable under the repealed assignee clause. Insurance subroga:.
tion situations involving loan receipts, while often concerned
with the object to avoid the jury, would be left in limbo by
this provision.
The last sentence of proposed section 1307(b) will render
vulnerable any diversity suit brought by a fiduciary on a cause
of action arising before his appointment.. As to causes arising.
190. Holt v. Middlebrook, 214 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1954); Barnes v.
Union Pac. R.R., 139 F. Supp. 198 (D.. Idaho 1956); Jones v. Goodman,
114 F. Supp. 110 (D. Kan. 1953); cf. Cooper v. American Airlines, Iiic.,
149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945); Goranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 221 F.
Supp. 820 (E.D. Va. 1963.); Elliot v. Day, 218 F. Supp. 90 (D.Ore. 1962);"
Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co. v. Baese, 136 F. Supp. 683 (.VLD.Tenn.
1955).
191. ALI, op. cit. supra note 187, at.23.,
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after his appointment, he will of course be less vulnerable but
subject to the argument that he was appointed in anticipation of
the causes arising. Further, this last sentence does not designate whose citizenship controls when that of the appointed
fiduciary is ignored. The broad sweep of the term "fiduciary"
could bring into question many ordinary business arrangements
and interstate fiduciary transactions. However, despite its deficiencies, the section could have a good effect by limiting egregious examples of manipulation. The courts, however, would
have to temper its use with good sense to reduce harrassing,
delaying arguments at the outset of every diversity suit. It
would also be hoped that appellate courts would vest a great
amount of discretion in the trial judges in deciding under the
section, at least when the trial judge upholds diversity, so that
cases that have gone to judgment would not be needlessly upset
on appeal by finding of jurisdictional fault.
Other proposed changes will affect real party problems more
remotely, but, it is believed, will be more universally welcomed
than those discussed above. It may be recalled that, the majority view notwithstanding, a real party objection can be likened to a nonwaivable, indispensable party objection. 1 2 Proposed section 1308 (a) and the accompanying proposed change to
Rule 12 (h) 1 3 would provide for waiver of objections to subject
matter jurisdiction except where relevant facts could not with
reasonable diligence have been discovered earlier by a party
raising the issue, or where collusion is established.0 4 However,
no change is proposed in Rule 12 (h) (2) which allows "a defense
of a failure to join a party indispensable under Rule 19" to be
raised at trial. Thus by providing for waiver of jurisdictional
challenge, but retaining nonwaiver of indispensable party objections, the proposal raises a possible loophole in its application
where the defendant at trial moves to join a real, indispensable
party whose presence would defeat diversity jurisdiction.
Real party objections are sometimes raised in the hope that
a change in the parties may be equated to a recommencement of
the action for the purpose of applying the statute of limitations. 95 The July 1, 1966, amendment to Rule 17(a) explicitly
precludes this strategy by providing for relation back of the
amendment to change parties. However, where the change in
192. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
193. ALI, op. cit. supra note 187, at 29-30.
194.

Id. at 24-25, 106-14.

195. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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parties would destroy diversity and thus result in dismissal, the
plaintiff under present law could be barred by the statute of
limitations from bringing his action in state court. Proposed
section 1308 (b) would presumably correct this situation by providing that the state statute of limitations would be tolled by
commencement of an action in federal court and for at least 30
days following dismissal for lack of diversity jurisdiction. 9 ,
Some problems could arise under this proposal where federal dis=
missal is based on a ground requiring that the action be recomz
menced in the name of a different party. The toll of the limitations statute applies to "a new action on the same claim." Defendants will no doubt argue that a change in parties makes the
state court action a "different claim." But interpretation of the
spirit of the new section and the overall purposes of statutes of
limitation should overcome this legalism.
CONCLUSION
Four categories of problems are identifiable in the last fifteen years of federal cases involving Federal Rule 17(a): (1)
Cases involving disputes over the mechanics of objection, waiver,
and timing as to change of parties. This category is not exclusive and covers all the cases and other categories; (2) Cases
where the basis of jurisdiction is diversity, but a change in the
parties would not affect it. In such cases state substantive law
under Erie is the main question; (3) Cases where the claimed
basis of jurisdiction is diversity and a change in the parties would
affect it. In these cases, though Erie controls, federal law has
the independent task of choosing the relevant citizenship and of
piercing collusive arrangements otherwise protected by state law;
(4) Cases where the basis of jurisdiction is a federal question, or
federal substantive law is properly applicable. In these cases
Erie is not applicable and federal common law determines who
has the substantive right.
As for category (1), the recent 1966 amendment to Rule
17(a) fairly well restates current practice. That is, valid real
party objections do not result in dismissal, but rather in free
amendment and substitution. As applied to category (2), the
main part of Rule 17(a) remains unnecessary and misleading.
Since in theory the holder of the state substantive right is the
proper person to sue, his status can be tested simply by state
substantive law principles. As for category (3), Rule 17(a) also
196. None of the constitutional objections to the validity of this proposal are substantial. ALI, op. cit. supra note 187, at 106-19.
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appears unnecessary. Relevant citizenship is mechanically made
to turn on the same rules and tests used in category (2) under
the standard test that the citizenship of the real party in interest
controls for diversity purposes. Collusiveness has developed no
real independent federal standards. As for cases in category (4),
which remain to be examined in detail in a later article, the
hypothesis still appears to be valid that if a real party rule is
unnecessary in a state system, as Professor Atkinson has shown,
the rule is equally unnecessary for that part of a federal system
which draws on federal common and statutory law to determine
who has the substantive right to be enforced.
Rule 17(a) is a barnacle on the federal practice ship. It
ought to be scraped away. If it were, some fear that lawyers
would point to its absence and argue that the ship is somehow
different without it. But Rules 19, 17(b) and substantive rules
as to stating a claim for relief are adequate without interjecting
the meaningless, logically inconsistent commands of the real
party in interest rule. The solution is to abolish it with the explanation that it is a fascinating historical growth but it is no
longer necessary. Assuming total abandonment cannot be accomplished, in the
alternative Professor Atkinson's next suggestion should be followed, as it was in New York. That is, abolish the first sentence,
or main part of the rule, and taking the list of people who may
bring suit without joining others, relocate it as part of Rule 19
under the flexible proviso "unless the court otherwise direct."
Failing this suggestion, it would be helpful to add to Rule 17(a)
that the rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 17(b) and Rule
19. And in any event, the word "the" in the first line of Rule
17(a) should be changed to "a" in order to eliminate arguments
and decisions based on the assumption that there is necessarily
only one real party in interest on any given side in any situation.
Aside from changing the rule itself, it would be good to develop a uniform federal procedural policy of full disclosure of all
interests to the jury and to adopt specific statutory provisions as
to determinative citizenship in diversity situations. Jury disclosure and diversity are the real problems. Rule 17(a) was
never designed to solve them and now merely confuses their
solution.

